



HOPE not hate
THE CHARITY



FEAR & HOPE 2016
RACE, FAITH AND BELONGING
IN TODAY'S ENGLAND

Professor Rob Ford and Nick Lowles

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In 2011 HOPE not hate published the ground-breaking *Fear and HOPE* report, the most extensive survey into attitudes and identity in today's England. Now, five years on, HOPE not hate is releasing a new report – *Fear and HOPE 2016*.

Written by Professor Robert Ford, of Manchester University, and HOPE not hate's Nick Lowles, and based on polling of 4,015 people by Populus, this report explores levels of fear, hate and hope in today's England. It investigates our attitudes and relationships with one another, and also with outsiders. It explores what pulls us apart but at the same time what brings us together. It identifies the drivers of fear and hope and the triggers that push people from one to the other.

Fear and HOPE 2016 examines how England has changed since five years ago. It explores the growing cultural divides in society.

New elements of the research examine our views on British values, Islam, terrorism and the EU.

This research will help guide HOPE not hate's work over the next few years, including the launch of our Middle England initiative which seeks to engage with and reshape the narrative of those voters in the centre ground of British politics in order to develop a more progressive consensus on issues such as immigration, cohesion, integration, extremism and human rights.

The authors



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Robert Ford is Professor of Political Science at the University of Manchester. He is the co-author of *Revolt on the Right*, a widely acclaimed study on UKIP and co-editor of *Sex, Lies and the Ballot Box*, a collection of essays on key findings in political science research. He has written numerous academic studies on topics including immigration, national identity, the radical right in politics, racial prejudice and public views of the welfare state. He writes widely on public opinion, politics and society for a wide range of outlets, including reports for the Migrants Rights Network, the Fabian Society, the George Marshall Foundation and the Home Office Migration Advisory Committee.



NICK LOWLES

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HOPE not hate

HOPE not hate exists to provide a positive antidote to the politics of hate. We combine first class research with community organising and grassroots actions to defeat hate groups and to build community resilience against extremism.

Hate is often the consequence of a loss of hope and an articulation of despair, but given an alternative, especially one that understands and addresses their anger, most people will choose HOPE over hate. Our job is to expose and undermine groups that preach hate, intolerance and division whilst uniting communities around what they have in common.

We aim to take a part in building a society that celebrates rather than scapegoats our differences.

To visit the Fear and HOPE website: www.fearandhope.org.uk

To learn more about HOPE not hate: www.hopenohate.org.uk/educational

Research objectives and methodology

OBJECTIVES

- To understand how adults in England view race, religion and identity in Britain as well as immigration into Britain
- To explore the attitudes of different demographics in relation to these themes
- To bring the 2011 segmentation up to date and explore the aforementioned themes through this segmentation

METHODOLOGY


- Populus interviewed 4015 adults aged 18+ between 1st February 2016 and 9th February 2016 representative by age, gender, social grade and ethnicity
- The sample was segmented using the same variables as 2011. These relate to attitudes and exposure to race, multiculturalism, immigration and religious minorities. This means that the 2016 analysis and 2011 segmentation is comparable
- Where the results do not sum to 100, this is due to rounding or the inclusion of multi-select answer options
- Populus is a member of the British Polling Council and abides by its rules. For more information please see www.populus.co.uk

Executive summary

THE TRIBES

The English can be broken down into six 'identity' tribes. Two are positive towards immigration and a multicultural society, two are strongly opposed. The remaining two are in the middle, one predominately working class and expressing economic anxieties around immigration, the other more affluent but expressing cultural concerns about integration and assimilation.

As this graph shows, there has been significant change in the size of each tribe since 2011.



REPORT HEADLINES

- England is a more tolerant and confident multicultural society than five years ago. Attitudes towards race, immigration and migration are more positive in England today, due mainly to growing optimism about the economy – the key driver in determining our hopes and fears – and changing demographics.
- Almost a third of people are very positive towards our multicultural society, up from 24% in 2011, whilst the proportion of Britons who are most strongly hostile to immigration and a multicultural society has declined from 13% to eight percent (8%).
- Immigration attitudes have become more flexible and welcoming, despite continued record net migration inflows.
- The English favour a “laissez-faire” interpretation of multiculturalism: they support celebrating diversity and making minorities feel welcome, but oppose altering British laws to accommodate minority communities’ practices and beliefs.
- While Muslims are regarded as a uniquely different and problematic religious minority, with 43% of English respondents thinking Muslims are “completely different” to them (a much higher figure than for other religious minorities), this is still a lower level than in 2011. The result is somewhat surprising, given the growing fear of Islamist extremism and the emergence of the Islamic State. The English, however, reject arguments which stigmatise all British Muslims and worry about the effects of discrimination and negative media portrayals.
- There is a growing separation between those who follow faith and those who don’t, with those who don’t becoming more vocal and larger in number than five years ago.

IDENTITY

- The English primarily identify as “British” – and British identity has become much more popular since 2011. Englishness is most popular with the identity segments which express the most anxiety about immigration diversity, and least popular with the more liberal and multicultural identity segments.
- The George Cross flag has become a less contentious symbol since 2011 – the most common reaction to it is “indifference”.
- The English believe it is their love of tradition and the monarchy, and the eccentric habits – ironic humour, an obsession with the weather and a love of queuing – which separate them from other countries. However, ethnic minority and, particularly, Muslim English place great emphasis on political values – respect and tolerance, human rights and equal opportunity – as the things which set Britain apart.

2. VIEWS ABOUT IMMIGRATION: TOUGH BUT PRAGMATIC

- Immigration attitudes have become more flexible and welcoming, despite continued record net migration inflows. Fifty percent (50%) now believe immigration has been good for the country overall, up from 40% in 2011.
- The share of English people wanting a total and permanent halt to immigration has fallen from 18% in 2011 to 13% in 2016. The share who say all kinds of migration should be allowed has risen from five percent (5%) to nine percent (9%).
- The “middle England” majority position is selective openness: 60% favour allowing only migrants who help the economy. As the economy has recovered, the emphasis on skills has waned: 33% want only skilled migrants (down from 39% in 2011) while 27% would admit economically useful migrants regardless of skills (up from 22%).
- The English are much less concerned now about the economic impact of migration than they were in 2011: the share worried that migrants threaten their job has halved from 23% to 12%, while the share thinking migrants threaten their wages has fallen from 34% to 25%.
- The most frequently-cited concern about immigration is the belief that immigrants receive welfare benefits without making sufficient contributions (cited by 51%). The *anxious/hostile* segments take this worry further, with many worrying that immigrants receive preferential treatment from the welfare system.
- The most frequently cited benefits of immigration are that immigrants do jobs that natives won't (51%) and that they work harder than natives for lower pay (37%).

3. MULTICULTURALISM AND INTEGRATION

- The English favour a “laissez-faire” interpretation of multiculturalism: they support celebrating diversity and making minorities feel welcome, but oppose altering British laws to accommodate minority communities' practices and beliefs.
- There is growing support for restrictions on free speech to protect racial and religious minorities. Sixty-one percent (61%) of English respondents supported legal enforceable limits on racially intolerant speech (up from 58% in 2011) and 46% supported similar limits on religiously intolerant speech (up from 40%). Support for such limits is highest among the young and *liberal/multicultural* segments.
- The English are deeply divided over whether Britain has become too tolerant of different cultures and beliefs. *Liberal/multicultural* segments and ethnic minorities strongly reject this notion, while *anxious/hostile* segments and older whites enthusiastically endorse it.
- The English are generally positive about life in a diverse society. Sixty percent (60%) believe variety is important for culture rather than undermining it (up from 49% in 2011).
- The English feel more positive about ethnic relations than in 2011: 41% believe different ethnic groups get on well, up from 29% in 2011. Fifty-one percent (51%) believe British Muslims are well integrated into society.
- The English support a wide range of more active integration policies targeted at Muslim immigrant communities. Seventy nine percent (79%) support measures to ensure all Muslim immigrants speak English; 70% support the active promotion of British values in Muslim communities; and 70% support closer monitoring of faith schools, including Muslim faith schools. All of these measures enjoy majority support from every major segment of English society, including from English Muslims.

4. RACE & RELIGION

- 75% of English people believe religious abuse is increasing, up from 71% in 2011. This is above the 62% share who believe racial abuse is rising (down from 64%).
- 38% of English people now regard religious abuse as more widespread than racial abuse, up from 28% in 2011.
- BAME share many of the concerns of wider society towards new immigration. Most are to be found in the *Immigrant Ambivalence* tribe.
- Muslims are regarded as a uniquely different and problematic religious minority: 43% of English respondents think Muslims are “completely different” to them, much higher than the figure for other religious minorities. Furthermore, 45% believe they cause problems in Britain and 59% believe they cause problems in the world.
- However, concern about problems caused by Muslims and other religious groups is much lower now than it was in 2011.
- Despite their concerns about Muslims, the English reject arguments which stigmatise all British Muslims, and worry about the effects of discrimination and negative media portrayals. Seventy-eight percent (78%) agreed that it would be wrong to blame an entire religion for the actions of a few extremists; 57% agreed discrimination was a serious problem for British Muslims; and 38% agreed Muslims were portrayed too negatively by the media (only 26% disagreed).

5. IDENTITY DIVIDES IN POLITICS

- UKIP's support is very concentrated in the *anxious/hostile* identity segment – 68% of UKIP supporters are in the *culturally concerned* or *latent hostile* segments, which make up 40% of the overall sample.
- The English have become less willing to support an “English nationalist” party. Thirty-nine percent (39%) said they were willing to support a new party focussed on defending the English, opposing immigration, challenging Islamic extremism, restricting the building of mosques – down from 48% in 2011. Forty-seven percent (47%) said they would oppose such a party, up from 42% in 2011.
- The English have also become less willing to back campaigns against the building of a mosque in their local area. Thirty-four percent (34%) said they would back such a campaign, down from 43% in 2011. Twenty-eight percent (28%) would oppose a local anti-mosque campaign, up from 19% in 2011.

6. THE EUROPEAN REFERENDUM

- The *liberal/multicultural* segments are positive about the EU – particularly on security and leadership and lean strongly towards “remain”. The *anxious/hostile* segments are very negative about the EU – particularly on immigration – and lean very strongly towards “leave”.
- The *concerned/ambivalent* identity segments are more divided, and could be swing voters in the EU referendum. The *culturally concerned* segment are evenly divided on both pro- and anti-EU arguments, but are negative about immigration and currently lean slightly towards Brexit. The *immigration ambivalent* segment are unconvinced by any of the arguments for or against the EU, and have the highest concentration of completely undecided voters.
- The 25-34 age group, Labour voters and Muslims are more uncertain about whether they are going to vote in the referendum. Over 65s and UKIP supporters are the most certain to vote.

Fear and Hope 2016: New Hopes,

INTRODUCTION

Five years ago HOPE not hate launched a pioneering report investigating the new politics of identity in Britain. Much has happened since then. The far-right political party, the British National Party (BNP) has collapsed. The UK Independence Party (UKIP) has surged to prominence. Immigration to Britain has continued at record levels, despite the election of a government pledged to reducing it. The rise of ISIS and terror incidents in Woolwich, Paris and elsewhere have kept Islamic extremism in the headlines. A referendum on Scottish independence prompted new conversations about the future of the United Kingdom north and south of Hadrian's wall. A second referendum in June of this year will once again bring a debate on Britain's role and identity, this time centred on Britain's relationship with the European Union. Rarely in British history have questions of identity been so central to political discussion. The biggest controversies in British politics today often hinge on who we are, how we are changing as a nation and where we want to go.

Our 2011 report revealed a nation fundamentally split into six "tribes" with very different outlooks and attachments. Two tribes – *confident multiculturalists* and *mainstream liberals* – were positive about the effects of migration and social change, and hopeful about Britain's future. But they were a minority, less than a quarter of the sample. At the other end of the spectrum were two other tribes – *latent hostiles* and *active enmity* – with deep seated fears about the impact of rapid social change, fears which often translated into active hostility, including (for a minority) support for the use of violence against groups perceived as a threat. The far-right BNP drew much of its energy and support from these tribes, which constituted a significant minority segment of around a quarter of the population.

Between the hopeful and the fearful lay the majority, in two „tribes“ wrestling with conflicting views about identity, social change and the state of Britain. *Immigration ambivalents* were insecure working class voters who worried about the impact of immigration on their communities and their economic circumstances. The *culturally concerned* were better off, but troubled by the impact immigration was having on British national identity and worried about immigrant integration.

Five years on, English attitudes have shifted in a more optimistic direction, which is perhaps surprising given the events of recent years. Respondents to the new *Fear and HOPE 2016* survey were much more positive about personal and national progress, more economically secure, and less anxious about identity change. They were also more positive about the impact of immigration, more comfortable with multiculturalism and more supportive of action against racial and religious hate speech.

This improvement in the national mood has also shifted the balance of power between the "tribes". The *liberal/multicultural* tribes have grown, while the *immigrant ambivalents* (who see immigration and identity through the lens of economic security) and the *active enmity* group (totally hostile to immigration and disaffected from politics) have shrunk.

Even on attitudes to Islam as a religion and Muslims in this country have improved. Whilst there is still a deep cultural gulf, the overwhelming majority of English people believe it is wrong to stigmatise a whole religious group for the actions of an extremist few.

Old fears remain, but these too have moderated. The combined size of the two "hostile" tribes is almost the same in 2016 (24%) as in 2011 (23%). But the most hostile tribe – *active enmity* – a group which opposes everything about migration and multiculturalism, and will often consider violence as a means of expressing its opposition – has fallen away. Meanwhile the *latent hostile* group, which has similarly intense concerns but is much less keen on confrontation, has grown. Pessimism and anxiety remains widespread in the segments of British society where these tribes dominate, but those who hold such concerns are more willing now to look to traditional politics for solutions.

Our 2011 report, which is evident again now, found a clear correlation between economic pessimism and fear and hate.

The political expression of English identity has also been transformed over the past five years. The greater willingness of the tribes opposed to migration and social change to engage with politics is, in part, a reflection of the growing political prominence of UKIP, a party which gives voice to such concerns, and whose support base is dominated by members of the two "hostile" tribes.

At the other end of the political spectrum, the liberal and multicultural "tribes" now dominate Labour's support base, due both to their own growth and to the departure of more anxious groups from the Labour electoral coalition. The balance of identity liberals and conservatives in the Conservative party is now much more even, too, presenting difficult challenges for the party of government as it decides policy on contentious identity issues.

The most immediate challenge is the coming referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union (EU), where identity politics divisions will play a central role. The *anxious/hostile* tribes, which combine strong opposition to immigration, pessimism about cultural change and assertive English nationalism, gravitate towards the "leave" campaign. Their views look set to clash with those of *liberal/multicultural* groups, which combine a cosmopolitan worldview with pro-migration attitudes and optimism about the future, and already line up quite strongly behind the "remain" campaign.

However, much is still up for grabs in the "swing" identity segments: *culturally concerned* voters who oppose the EU as a source of migrants, but support it as a source of economic and social stability; and *immigration ambivalent* voters who have few firm views about the EU but a political outlook defined by economic anxiety. Two very different visions of England will clash in the EU referendum campaign, which may be the first of many political contests structured, in part, by the competing identity and values of voters at opposite poles of the identity politics spectrum.

Old Fears



Photo: Ian Halsey

I: Defining the “tribes” of British identity

1 IDENTITY AND POLITICAL LOYALTIES

Our research has found six distinct identity groups in society. Two are positive, of varying degrees, towards immigration and a multicultural society, two are opposed. The remaining two are in the middle. One of these middle groups are defined by their economic anxieties and the other by their cultural anxieties.

Here are the six identity tribes:

1. LIBERAL/MULTICULTURAL (32% in 2016, 24% in 2011)

a. Confident Multiculturals (18% of the population in 2016, 8% in 2011)

Most likely to be graduates or post graduates, these people are predominantly professionals and managers. They are more prevalent in London and the South East and among people who identify with Labour, Liberal Democrat and the Greens. Outgoing, social and happy with their lives, they are confident about their own, as well as their country's future, and think Britain has benefitted from immigration. This group has more than doubled in size since 2011, as economic recovery and a growing sense of confidence and security have encouraged more people to adopt an optimistic, outward looking perspective.

b. Mainstream Liberals (14% in 2016, 16% in 2011)

These people are optimistic, self-motivated and for the most part educated to at least degree level. They see immigration as a net benefit to the country, and usually differ from *Confident Multiculturals* only in their level of enthusiasm. This group has remained roughly the same size as in 2011.

2. CONCERNED/AMBIVALENT (44% in 2016, 52% in 2011)

a. Immigration Ambivalents (20% in 2016, 28% in 2011)

These people are less financially secure and less optimistic about the future. They are more likely to be working class, to live in social housing and to view immigration through the prism of its economic impact on their opportunities and the social impact on their communities. Muslims and other BME (Black Minority Ethnic) groups are more prevalent here as are the largest single segment of those who identify with Labour. This group has declined sharply in size since 2011 – given *immigration ambivalents'* greater sensitivity to economic conditions, this is most likely due to the improvement in national economic conditions and in household economic optimism over the past five years.

b. Culturally Concerned (24% in 2016, 24% in 2011)

Generally older and more prosperous than other groups, many are (or have been) professionals and managers. They are more likely to view immigration as a cultural issue with concerns about the impact of immigration on national identity and about immigrants' willingness to integrate. This group is the same size now as in 2011 (or roughly a quarter of English respondents). It forms the largest segment of those identifying with the Conservative Party, though it is much less dominant within the party in 2016 than it was in 2011.

3. ANXIOUS/HOSTILE (24% in 2016, 23% in 2011)

a. Latent Hostiles (16% in 2016, 10% in 2011)

More likely to be older, not university-educated, and more than likely working class. They view their own future with uncertainty and Britain's future with pessimism. For them, immigration has undermined British culture, public services and their own economic prospects. They would support political forces that stood-up for their identity and way of life, but are less confrontational than those in *Active Enmity*. This group has grown considerably since 2011, but the most likely explanation is re-engagement with the political process from people formerly in the “active enmity” segment, which has declined sharply. The latent hostiles form the largest segment of those identifying with UKIP, and the rise of UKIP to political prominence may explain the greater political engagement of hostile identity segments in 2016 compared to 2011.


b. Active Enmity (8% in 2016, 13% in 2011)

Drawing more support from the unskilled and the unemployed, these people are the most deeply disengaged from traditional political processes and the most hostile to immigrants and what they think immigration represents. Opposed to all ethnicities or religions other than their own, many also believe that violence is acceptable if it is a consequence of standing up for what is ‘right’.² This group has declined sharply since 2011, an encouraging development which suggests that even those with deep concerns about immigration and identity are now more willing to engage with the political system, and less willing to consider direct action or violence as a means to express their concerns.

ty politics



English population by segment

- Confident multiculturals
- Mainstream liberals
- Immigrant ambivalence
- Culturally concerned
- Latent hostiles
- Active enmity



1. Base: all 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)

I: Defining the “tribes” of British identity politics (continued)



THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE IDENTITY SEGMENTS, 2011 AND 2016

There is a clear **age gradient** in the pattern of identity attachment: young English people tend towards the liberal/multicultural segments, while the old lean towards the anxious and hostile segments. However, this age gradient is, in part, a new development: the age difference in liberal/multicultural support was not present in 2011, and is the product of a sharp decline in the share of the young who fall into the economically anxious *immigration ambivalence* segment.

This suggests that the identity attachments of the young are more sensitive to economic conditions, most likely reflecting their greater exposure to shifts in the economic climate. When times are hard, as they were in 2011, the young become hard headed: worries about economic competition drove their views on immigration and diversity. When conditions become more favourable, as they are now, the young gravitate towards multiculturalism. This may reflect an underlying tendency towards liberal and cosmopolitan values among the young¹, but one that is over-ridden by the need for economic security (when times are hard).

The views of the older cohorts are more consistent across our two surveys, suggesting they are less sensitive to an economic context. The *culturally concerned* are the largest segment for the 55-64s and (particularly) pensioners in both surveys. A majority of respondents in all the cohorts older than 45 fall into either this


category or one of the actively hostile categories in both years. Worries about the cultural impact of immigration and ethnic change, and active hostility to such developments, is concentrated among older English respondents – those who grew up in a very different England, with lower levels of ethnic and religious diversity and a much lower rate of migration.

When we break down our sample by **social class**, two interesting stories emerge. Firstly, the growth in the *confident multicultural* segment, and the decline in the *active enmity* segment, is spread right across the whole class spectrum. All walks of middle class and working class England now feature more people who embrace a cosmopolitan outlook and a liberal approach to immigration, and fewer who violently reject immigration and the cultural change associated with it.

Secondly, there is a particularly notable shift in the views of the “C2” class, skilled and semi-skilled workers in often insecure, private sector work in sectors like manufacturing, retail and services. This segment of the workforce swung particularly strongly against Labour after the 2010 election², and in our original 2011 survey they expressed the strongest affiliation with the *immigration ambivalent* segment, whose opposition to immigration was driven principally by economic anxiety. Five years later, the share of C2s in the *immigration ambivalent* group has fallen from 40% to 25%, suggesting a sharp decline in economic concerns about immigration in this politically-critical group. The C2s have

Education and religion

1. Q5. Educational attainment. Base: all (4015), 2011 (5054)
2. Q7. Religion. Base: all 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)



I: Defining the “tribes” of British identity politics (continued)

polarised as their economic concerns have receded, with growing numbers affiliating to tribes at opposite ends of the identity politics spectrum: the C2 share in the *confident multicultural* segment is up 11 points from 2% to 13%, while the share in the very negative *latent hostile* group is also up sharply – from 14% to 23%. Anxiety about immigrant competition united C2s in the wake of the Great Recession, but as such concerns have receded, and views of the cultural impact of migration have come to the fore, they have become more divided.

The differences in identity attachments by gender are relatively modest. There is some evidence that women tend more to the *immigration ambivalent* group, suggesting a greater concern with the economic impacts of migration; while men are more attracted to the *latent hostile* group, suggesting somewhat stronger negativity to immigration and social change.

Education has a strong association with identity attachments. There is a large and growing educational divide in attachment to the liberal/multicultural segments: these are very popular among students, graduates and postgraduates, all of whom have become more strongly attached to multicultural identity since 2011: *confident multiculturals* increased their share by 10 percentage points among graduates (from 11 to 21%), 14 points among postgrads (from 15 to 29%) and 27 points among students (from 14 to 41%). However, only four percent (4%) of school leavers in 2011 belonged to the *confident multicultural* segment, a figure which grew by just seven points to 11% in 2016.


At the other end of the spectrum, the anxious/hostile identity segments are under-represented in the groups with university experience, but over-represented among school leavers. Nearly a third of school leavers fall into the *latent hostile* (20%) or *active enmity* (11%) segments, but less than one in five graduates (and just six percent of students) do so.

Interestingly, the „swing“ identity segments – the internally conflicted *immigrant ambivalents* culturally concerned – are quite similar in size across educational groups (although relatively few students fall into the “culturally concerned” segment). This suggests that while education may alter attachments to the extremes of the identity spectrum – the highly-educated affiliate more with the multicultural tribes, while those with little schooling are more attracted to the hostile tribes – the majority of people, regardless of their education level, tend to fall in the conflicted centre ground.

Turning to **religion**, those expressing an openly Christian identity are somewhat more likely to affiliate with the *culturally concerned* segment, while those saying they have no religion are somewhat less so, reflecting the different emphasis these two groups place on traditional notions of English identity. English Muslims are, however, highly distinctive (though the sample sizes in this case are quite small, and may not be entirely representative). Muslims in the sample express much higher affiliation with liberal segments, but also with the economically anxious *immigration ambivalent* segment. Few Muslims fall into the hostile identity segments.

Political affiliation by segment

1. Q361. Which of the following political parties do you most identify yourself with, even if you don't identify with any of them entirely? Base: all 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)



IDENTITY AND POLITICAL LOYALTIES, 2011 AND 2016

CONSERVATIVES: Sceptical views are dominant among Conservative supporters. However, there has been a strong shift since 2011, with liberal/multicultural identifiers now much more prominent.

The *culturally concerned* are still the largest group in the Tory electoral coalition, accounting for one third of Conservative supporters. This is down sharply from 2011, when they made up 42%. The *confident multiculturalists* have more than tripled from a small fringe of five percent in 2011 to a significant minority of 17% today. As a result, the balance of power within the Conservative support base has changed. In 2011, two thirds of Conservative identifiers were in either the *culturally concerned* or the outright *hostile* identity segments. Strident opposition to immigration and multiculturalism was therefore the most electorally prudent stance to take. Now, the liberal identity groups, with 29% of Conservative identifiers, outnumber the outright hostile groups, with 24%, while the culturally concerned have also declined sharply as a share of the supporter base. A strongly anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism stance risks alienating as many current supporters than it satisfies. The electoral logic of such a supporter mix may therefore point to a more nuanced approach, recognising anxieties but also emphasising the positives of immigration and diversity.

LABOUR: The balance of power between different identity tribes has also shifted within Labour. In 2011, the largest group were the *immigration ambivalents*, who had strong concerns about the effects of immigration on their jobs, wages, and economic security;

the *culturally concerned* and *actively hostile* segments outnumbered the liberal/multicultural segments within the Labour voter base.

Labour was aware that immigration therefore posed a problem for the party, with two thirds of their supporters expressing some mix of economic or cultural anxiety, and many of these voters taking a pretty dim view of Labour's record on immigration in government³. Labour in opposition made various efforts to articulate and respond to the concerns of their voters, but often faced criticism from its activists, who tended towards a more cosmopolitan worldview and often regarded such efforts as catering to intolerance. These internal conflicts are now somewhat less problematic, as the balance of electoral power has shifted quite strongly towards the liberal/multicultural groups. *Confident multiculturalists* have doubled their share of Labour's support base, from 12% to 24%. The *immigration ambivalent* segment, primarily worried about the economic effects of migration, has fallen away even more sharply, declining from 37% to 21%. There is thus a more receptive audience in the current Labour electoral coalition for the more strident pro-migration stances of current leader Jeremy Corbyn. However, an uncompromising cosmopolitan outlook still comes with significant electoral risks: the four in 10 Labour supporters who fall into the *confident multicultural* or *mainstream liberal* segments are exactly balanced by another 40% who fall into the *culturally concerned* segment or one of the actively hostile segments. Strongly pro-migration positions, such as the rejection of proposed time limits on migrants' access to welfare, are likely to antagonise as many Labour voters than they attract.



Local residents wave teapots at EDL protestors in York, May 2013

I: Defining the “tribes” of British identity politics (continued)

LIBERAL DEMOCRATS: The much-reduced Liberal Democrat electorate is now dominated by liberal/multicultural identity tribes, who now make up half of the party's supporter base, up from 42% in 2011. The more strongly committed *confident multicultural*s have more than doubled from 14% in 2011 to 30% in 2016. This should make internal debates over identity politics easier for the party to resolve, but may pose problems as it seeks to recover from its record collapse in 2015. Most of the best electoral prospects for the party are southern English seats currently held by the Conservatives, where the voters they need to win will tend towards more conservative views (with large numbers of the *culturally concerned*) economically well off but anxious about social change. A stronger commitment to liberal/multicultural values will appeal to the party's remaining supporters but may put off those it needs to target in order to recover.


GREENS: The Greens fall on the opposite pole of the identity divide to UKIP. Green supporters are dominated by the liberal/multicultural segments who are absent from the UKIP support base, while the anxious/hostile groups which dominate UKIP are barely visible in the Green party. Forty percent (40%) of Green supporters are from the *confident multicultural* segment, more than in any other party (and double the 18% share of the smaller Green support base in 2011). Another 27% come from the *mainstream liberal* segment, with a similar outlook but less intensely expressed. Just 11% come from the *culturally concerned* segment, the lowest of any party, while five percent (5%) come from one of the two anxious/hostile segments (also the lowest of any party).

PROFILE: UKIP SUPPORTERS

UKIP is quite distinct from all the other parties in two respects. The liberal/multicultural segments who form a significant part of all the other parties' support bases are almost completely absent from UKIP's electorate: just five percent of the party's supporters belong to the *confident multicultural* (1%) or *mainstream liberal* (4%) segments. UKIP's support base is instead completely dominated by sceptical or actively hostile groups, and its rapid growth since 2011 has come by recruiting new voters from these groups. Two thirds of 2016 UKIP support come from two tribes: *latent hostiles* (38%) and the *culturally concerned* (28%).

These are both groups who share an unease about the social changes associated with immigration and rising diversity. Both groups favour a more assertive approach to the expression and protection of their own identity and culture, and many within them now clearly see UKIP as a means to voice this concern. It is very clear that UKIP mobilises a very distinctive set of identity concerns and anxieties: it is the only large party in which the anxious and hostile are dominant.


The rise of UKIP provides these voters with a voice in politics, which may help them to re-engage with the political system as a whole. However, a knock-on effect of UKIP's rise is that the anxious and hostile segments are now less prominent in the support bases of the traditional parties of government, in particular the currently governing Conservatives. The price of having a powerful new voice in politics is that the segments who have mobilised behind UKIP may now have less electoral influence over the current party of government.




NOTES

- 1 Ford, R (2008) "Is racial prejudice declining in Britain?", *British Journal of Sociology*; Tilley, J (2005) "Libertarian-Authoritarian Value Change in Britain 1974-2001", *Political Studies*
 - 2 Liam Byrne (2010) "Why Did Labour Lose? And How Can We Win Again?", *Progress*
 - 3 YouGov (2013) "Voters: Immigration was too high under Labour" <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/10/15/voters-immigration-too-high-labour/>
- Morris, J (2015) "Why did voters reject Labour?" <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/05/why-did-voters-reject-labour>


The Economy




Values




Mosque application and violence




Religion and culture



Immigration



Muslims



I: Defining the “tribes” of British identity politics (continued)


2. THE MOOD IN 2016 ENGLAND: ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND RENEWED CONFIDENCE

The 2011 Fear and Hope survey, conducted in the aftermath of economic crisis and at the onset of austerity spending cuts, revealed an insecure and pessimistic England. More than half of our respondents thought things had got worse for them over the past decade, and over 80% felt that things had worsened for Britain as a whole. Our 2016 survey reveals a much more optimistic country: 62% thought things were better for themselves and their families than a decade ago (up 16 points on 2011), while 40% thought things had improved for Britain as a whole (up 22 points on 2011). The improved mood was felt across society – all major social groups posted double digit gains in optimism on both of these measures. There is cautious optimism about economic prospects going forward as well. A majority of our respondents think economic conditions will either improve or stay as they are over the next 12 months. Pessimism is a minority view, though more people think things will get worse for a nation as a whole (37%) in the coming year than believe their own household's situation will deteriorate (21%).

The general mood of cautious optimism is also found in broader views. The share of British people who feel success or failure in life is in their control is high and rising – 80% in 2016, up from 75% in 2011. The common view of radical populists on the left and right – that merit and effort mean little in a society where self-serving elites take all the rewards – is not one shared by the vast majority of British voters. The British are also remarkably satisfied with their lot in life – 77% report being happy with their lives so far (up from 75% in 2011) – and a majority of 53% say they are optimistic about the future (up from 47% in 2011). Middle England in 2016 is, broadly, a place at peace with itself, and with rising hopes of a better future to come.

THE MOOD OF THE IDENTITY TRIBES

While the overall picture is one of cautious optimism, there are some important differences in outlook between the identity segments, which were evident in the more downbeat 2011 data and remain in 2016 despite the improvement in overall mood.



In both of our surveys, the liberal and multicultural groups are more positive about life and optimistic about the future, while the anxious/threatened groups are more downbeat about their current circumstances and pessimistic about times ahead.


The liberal identity tribes – confident multiculturals and mainstream liberals – feel happy and in control of their lives. 84% of “confident multiculturals” and 81% of “mainstream liberals” report being happy with their lives while 85% of both groups believe how well they do in life is down to them, and over two thirds of both groups report optimism about the future. All of these attitudes are similar to those reported in 2011 – but these optimistic liberals constitute a larger share of the population now than they did then. Their views about the past ten years are also markedly different – the share of both liberal/multicultural groups who say things are better now than a decade ago for themselves and their families is above 70%, up from under 60% in 2011. Around half think things are better than a decade ago for Britain as a whole, roughly double the share expressing such optimism a decade ago.

Pessimism is more frequently encountered at the other end of the identity spectrum, but even here the mood is less dour than it was in 2011. The proportion of “latent hostiles” and “active enmity” who report being happy with life is stable at around two thirds, but more people in both groups report being in control of their lives now than in 2011. A large majority of nearly seven in ten are pessimistic about the future, but this is down somewhat on five years ago when three quarters were pessimists. They are more upbeat about progress over the past decade – nearly half of “latent hostiles” now think things are better for them and their families than ten years ago (up from 35% in 2011), while 41% of “active enmity” report an improvement (up from 25%). A growing minority of these gloomy tribes even see an improvement in conditions nationwide – 29% of “latent hostiles” say Britain is better off than a decade ago (up from just 8% in 2011), while 17% of the even grumpier “active enmity” think the same (up from 5%).

Views about the future

% agreeing with opposing statements about the future by segment

1. Q22. Please say which of these pairs of statements you most agree with, even if you don't agree with either entirely. Base: all (4015)



ENGLAND'S YOUNG: LIBERAL OPTIMISTS?


One signal of the possible future state of identity politics is the views of the young: if they hold distinctive views (and these views remain distinctive as they age), then such views are likely to become more prominent in coming years as they weight in the electorate grows. The views of 18-24 year olds in our sample are indeed distinct on a number of key identity politics issues. They are more optimistic – for themselves, for their country and about the economy – though this may reflect the fact they have no adult memories of the 2008 financial crisis.

The young are more enthusiastic about diversity and multiculturalism, and more positive about ethnic relations. The young strongly believe that Muslims are portrayed too negatively by the media, and that discrimination causes serious problems for British Muslims. They are much more likely to reject negative portrayals of Muslims as threatening or extremist, and to back efforts to support Muslim communities.


They are also much more positive about immigration and its effects, despite being the group most directly exposed to immigrant competition. They believe immigration is good for Britain and support more liberal immigration policies. If the young retain this liberal optimism as they age, it suggests the balance of power in identity politics will slowly shift towards the liberal/multicultural groups in years to come.

The Economy


■ 18-24 ■ Total




Values




St George's flag, do you feel




Multiculturalism




Immigration




Combating extremism




Mosque application and violence



Religion and culture



Muslims



II: Specific issues

1. IDENTITY: NATIONAL & LOCAL

KEY POINTS

- The English primarily identify as “British” and British identity has become much more popular since 2011
- Englishness is most popular with the identity segments who express the most anxiety about immigration diversity, and least popular with the more liberal and multicultural identity segments
- Ethnic minority and Muslim English people strongly favour British or “hyphenated British” (black British, Muslim British) identities
- The George Cross flag has become a less contentious symbol: the most common reaction to it is “indifference”. The share of people expressing negative emotions about the flag is lower than in 2011
- The English are divided over what marks someone out as British. The *liberal/multicultural* segments, the young and ethnic minorities emphasise citizenship; the *anxious/hostile* segments, the old and the working class place greater stress on birth and ancestry
- The English believe it is their love of tradition and the monarchy, and the eccentric habits – ironic humour, an obsession with the weather and a love of queuing – which separates them from other countries
- However, ethnic minority and particularly Muslim English, place great emphasis on political values – respect and tolerance, human rights and equal opportunity – as the things which set Britain apart
- The English believe British values can accommodate religious diversity, but they also believe British values draw their strength from being a source of continuity, not from their flexibility in response to social change.

Identity has been at the heart of British political debate over the last decade. In the later years of the 1997-2010 Labour government, Gordon Brown sought to respond to growing public divides over immigration and integration by developing a new definition of British identity and values to form a focal point for integration efforts.¹

Identity was at the forefront of politics during the Coalition government of 2010-15, with intensified debate over the relationship between Britishness and its constituent national identities in the wake of surging support for the Scottish National Party, the 2014 Scottish referendum on independence and the emergence of UKIP as a vehicle for a more assertive English nationalism.

Evidence from the British Social Attitudes surveys suggests the English have become more aware of the asymmetric nature of political devolution, which provides separate institutions for the Scottish and Welsh, but not the English, and are keen to see this rebalanced with a strong political and institutional voice for England as well².

While support for an English Parliament, championed by UKIP, remains relatively low³, the idea of “English Votes for English Laws” appeals to many English voters⁴, and has now been put into practice by the Conservative government.

While Englishness is now firmly on the political agenda, our surveys suggest that the English still primarily identify with Britain, a tendency which has intensified over the past five years.

When offered a set of six identity options – British, English, European, hyphenated British, hyphenated English or none of the above – 54% opted for British (up from 50% in 2011) while 33% opted for English (down from 39%). Few English people see themselves primarily as European: just five percent (5%) of the total in both years. Hyphenated British identities (black British, Muslim British and so on) are popular with ethnic minorities, favoured by 35% of BAME voters and 42% of Muslims, but minorities shun both English and hyphenated English identities suggesting they still see these as “white”.


A look at the identity attachments of the different tribes suggests a possible reason for this: “English” as a primary identity is most popular with the *active enmity* tribe with the most negative views of diversity, and least popular with the *confident multiculturals* who are keenest to embrace it. Britishness is, however, the majority preference of all six identity segments.

However, while voters seem to shy away from Englishness as a primary identity, they have also become more relaxed about one of its most visible expressions: the display of George Cross flags. This was the subject of a minor political controversy in 2014 when Emily Thornberry, a Labour MP, posted a picture of a house displaying three George Cross flags. Her comments about the flag were widely criticised as revealing a metropolitan liberal disdain for expressions of English identity among Labour’s political elite, and led to her dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet.

How do you define yourself?

1. Q.14 How do you define yourself? Base: all (4015)


% defining themselves as ... by demographic group



How do you define yourself?

1. Q.14 How do you define yourself? Base: all (4015)

% defining themselves as ... by segment



Our survey suggests Ms Thornberry's alleged reaction is indeed a minority one. Few find the sight of a George Cross flag surprising or offensive. Instead the English divide between those who find the flag a source of patriotism (29%) and pride (22%) and those who are indifferent to it (36%).

The main change in recent years has been normalisation – the share expressing surprise, irritation or conflicted feelings when they see the George Cross has fallen sharply since 2011, from


13% to just seven percent (7%) – while the share who react with an indifferent shrug of the shoulders has risen even more, from 28% to 36%. Plenty of English people take pride in their flag, particularly those in the more anxious or hostile identity tribes, while those who don't seem quite happy to live and let live.

When asked what they consider the most important influence on their identities, a more nuanced picture emerges.

II: Specific issues (continued)

Response to seeing St George's flag

% saying they would feel a certain way if they saw a St George's flag on someone's house outside of a major national occasion



1. Q15. Which of these words would best describes how you would feel if you saw a St George's flag on someone's house outside of a major national occasion (such as England at the World Cup)? Base: all 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)

Nationality is a very popular option with all social groups, but there is a lot of variation in the other influences people emphasise. The young and the *confident multicultural* tribe emphasise locality, while pensioners and more hostile or sceptical tribes emphasise birthplace. British Muslims are unique in placing great emphasis on religion as a source of identity.


A similar complex mix of views emerges when we ask people which things they think are important for someone to be regarded as British.

No single factor was uniformly popular across groups. The under 25s (36%), ethnic minorities (40%), *confident multiculturals* (36%) and *mainstream liberals* (30%) tend to favour citizenship as the key marker of Britishness, chosen by 20% overall. All four of the sceptical or "swing" identity tribes, however, tend to place greater emphasis on ancestry. Between a third and a half name birthplace or parents' birthplace as the key marker of identity. The *culturally concerned* (37%) and the *latent hostile* (38%) tribes also place strong emphasis on "putting being British before religion or ethnicity", suggesting they expect a positive affirmation of a unifying British identity to assuage their anxieties about the negative effects of diversity and multiculturalism.

What differentiates the British from other nations? The most popular answers tend to be about cultural conservatism – love of tradition, support for the monarchy or local eccentricities, such as ironic humour, talking about the weather, a love of queuing – rather than the abstract values favoured by politicians. However, there are some interesting variations beneath the surface.

Response to seeing St George's flag

% saying they would feel a certain way if they saw a St George's flag on someone's house outside of a major national occasion by segment



1. Q15. Which of these words would best describes how you would feel if you saw a St George's flag on someone's house outside of a major national occasion (such as England at the World Cup)? Base: all (4015)

Ethnic minorities and, in particular, Muslim Britons, place great emphasis on liberal values, such as respect and tolerance, human rights and equal opportunity. The more anxious or hostile identity tribes place greater emphasis on tradition and the monarchy, while the *confident multiculturals* regard ironic humour as the defining British feature (both groups, perhaps, projecting their own preferences onto the nation as a whole).


The public regard the link between diversity and common British values as a two-way street. When asked to choose between the statement: "You can share and uphold British values and still live a life consistent with your religious faith whatever that is" and the statement: "Sharing and upholding British values makes holding to some religious principles difficult", the English heavily prefer the former (48% to 28%, with 24% rejecting both), pointing to a

Important aspects of being British

% saying which is the most, 2nd most and 3rd most important factor to be regarded as British

1. Q17. Which of these things do you think is ... for someone be regarded as British?
Base: all (4015), 2011 (5054)


[in order according to average of most, 2nd most and 3rd most]



Most important aspect of being British

% saying which is the most important factor to be regarded as British by segment

1. Q17. Which of these things do you think is ... for someone be regarded as British? Base: all (4015)



II: Specific issues (continued)

belief that British identity can accommodate religious diversity. However, when asked to choose between: “British values gain strength from changing and adapting over time to take account of those who come here to make a new life” and: “British values gain strength from being constant even as people come here to make a new life”, the English favour continuity over flexibility. Forty five percent (45%) say British values gain strength from being constant, while 29% see adaptation as a source of strength (and 26% reject both).

The English, then, value accommodating diversity but not at a cost to continuity. They take pride in their ability to make space for those with different faiths, but they also value their traditions and expect minority faiths and cultures to accept and uphold these. While the continuity of traditions and ancestry matter to some, particularly those who find the rapid change of recent decades alienating, most of the English regard identity as a pragmatic balance between the need to accommodate diversity and cultural change and the need to maintain a common core of values, symbols and beliefs around which all groups in society can unite.


NOTES

- 1 Brown, G (2006) The Future of Britishness, Fabian New Year Conference, 2006; Heath, A and Roberts, J (2008); British Identity: Its Sources and Possible Implications for Civic Attitudes and Behaviour”, report for Lord Goldsmith’s citizenship review: <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/british-identity.pdf>
- 2 See, for example Curtice, J; Devine, P and Ormston, R (2013) “Devolution”: <http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-30/devolution/introduction.aspx>
- 3 19% in the 2014 British Social Attitudes survey: <http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-31/key-findings/britain-2014.aspx>
- 4 In a 2015 MORI survey, 52% of British respondents backed preventing Scottish MPs from voting on matters which affected England but not Scotland, and 59% backed giving English MPs a veto on proposals affecting only England

Which demographics describe Britain positively

% of different demographic groups using positive and negative words to best describe Britain

1. Q13a. Which of these words and phrases do you think best describes Britain today? Base: all (4015)



2. VIEWS ABOUT IMMIGRATION: TOUGH BUT PRAGMATIC

KEY POINTS

- Immigration attitudes have become more liberal and positive, despite continued record net migration inflows: 50% now believe immigration has been good for the country overall, up from 40% in 2011.
- The share of English people wanting a total and permanent halt to immigration has fallen, from 18% in 2011 to 13% in 2016. The share who say all kinds of migration should be allowed has risen from five percent (5%) to nine percent (9%).
- The “middle England” majority position is selective openness: 60% favour allowing only migrants who help the economy. As the economy has recovered, the emphasis on skills has waned: 33% want only skilled migrants (down from 39% in 2011) while 27% would admit economically useful migrants regardless of skills (up from 22%).
- The English are much less concerned now about the economic impact of migration than they were in 2011: the share worried that migrants threaten their job has halved from 23% to 12%, while the share thinking migrants threaten their wages has fallen from 34% to 25%.
- The most frequently cited concern about immigration is the belief that immigrants receive welfare benefits without making sufficient contributions (cited by 51%). The *anxious/hostile* identity segments take this worry further, with many worrying that immigrants receive preferential treatment from the welfare system.
- The most frequently cited benefits of immigration are that immigrants do jobs that natives won't (51%) and that they work harder than natives for lower pay (37%).
- The *liberal/multicultural* segments of the English public also emphasise the economic dynamism and cultural contribution of migrants, but this view is not shared by other identity segments.
- The majority of English respondents think Britain is taking too many (43%) or about the right number (27%) of Syrian refugees. Large majorities of the *anxious/hostile* segments believe Britain is taking too many, while demands to take a larger number are a minority view even among the most liberal “confident multicultural” identity segment (and among English Muslims).

Immigration has been one of the most polarising political issues in recent years. Net migration to Britain has continued at record levels, as a surge in migration from the EU thwarted Conservative efforts to deliver large cuts to net migration in the 2010-15 Coalition government.

Voters have consistently rated immigration as one of the most important problems facing the nation, and growing frustration about the issue has been a key factor in the emergence of UKIP.¹

While immigration clearly remains higher than much of the public would like it to be, our survey finds evidence of increasing English pragmatism and flexibility on the issue, and a shift towards more open attitudes overall.

Half of the public now believes immigration is good for Britain overall, up from 40% in 2011. The young, ethnic minorities and the middle classes are particularly positive about migration, while the working class tends to take a negative view.

Fading concerns about economic competition from migrants as the economy has recovered were also evident elsewhere in the survey: the share of people worried that migrants put their job at risk halved from 23% to 12% between 2011 and 2016, while the share worried immigrants made it harder to get a fair wage fell from 34% to 25%.

Few issues divide the English identity tribes more than immigration. An overwhelming majority of the liberal segments: 90% of the *confident multicultural*s and 85% of the *mainstream liberals* - regard immigration as good for Britain. An equally solid majority of the two *anxious/hostile* segments – 81% of the *latent hostiles* and 98% of the *active enmity* segment – regard immigration as bad for Britain. The *ambivalent/concerned* segments fall between these poles, but tend towards immigration scepticism: 55% of the *culturally concerned* see immigration as bad for the country, as do 60% of *immigration ambivalents*.

The English, then, remain deeply divided over the effects of immigration despite a positive shift in overall views. We also find an overall liberal shift in attitudes, but here there is a bit more evidence of flexibility and pragmatism across the identity politics spectrum. The share of English respondents wanting immigration halted entirely and permanently fell from 18% in 2011 to 13% in 2016, while the share of people who thought all kinds of immigration should be allowed rose to nine percent (9%) from five percent (5%).

While total control and total openness attract minorities, a large majority of the English opt for some form of selective openness: 60% favoured allowing only migrants who “help the economy”. Despite record migration rates, the sharp improvement in the labour market has shifted views on skills: the share favouring only allowing skilled migrants is down from 39% to 33% while the share saying both skilled and unskilled migrants able to help the economy should be let in is up from 22% to 27%.


The identity tribes are divided over the best immigration policy, but selective openness of some form is the majority preference of

II: Specific issues (continued)

Is immigration good or bad for the country?

% saying whether immigration is good or bad for the country by demographic


1. Q22. Please say which of these pairs of statements you most agree with, even if you don't agree with either entirely. Base: all 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)



Is immigration good or bad for the country?

% saying whether immigration is good or bad for the country by segment


1. Q22. Please say which of these pairs of statements you most agree with, even if you don't agree with either entirely. Base: all (4015)



Best immigration policy for the country

% saying which policy is the best for the country by segment

1. Q24. Which of the following policies on immigration do you think is the best for this country? Base: all (4015)



both *liberal/multicultural* segments and both *concerned/ambivalent* segments, and attracts significant minority support even from the more negative *latent hostile* segment.

The *confident multicultural* and *mainstream liberal* segments tend to favour allowing all migrants who benefit the economy, regardless of skills, but significant minorities in both these groups also favour only allowing skilled migrants. Restricting migration to only those with skills is the most popular choice in both concerned/ambivalent groups, favoured by 34% of *immigration ambivalents* and 47% of the *culturally concerned*. In both of these groups, however, a significant minority would allow in all economically beneficial migrants regardless of skill level.

Even among the *latent hostile* segment – who tend to express very negative views about migration and diversity – there is widespread support at least for skilled economic migration (36% back it, more than any other policy option). However, in this segment the majority favour a total halt to immigration (either temporary or permanent). This is even more true for the more intensely disaffected *active enmity* segment, 80% of whom back a total halt to migration, with half wanting migration permanently stopped.

Our data suggests the popular image of Britain as inflexibly and angrily opposed to immigration is misleading. The “middle England” majority is pragmatic and responsive to conditions, and people support migration so long as the contribution is clear, and have become more open and less anxious as the economic situation has improved since 2011, despite continued record migration inflows. This pattern of pragmatic flexibility is also found in other recent research.

Evidence from the British Social Attitudes suggests the British are highly responsive to the skill levels and economic contributions of migrants, and are very supportive of admitting migrants when the economic case is strong.² Work by the think tank British Future has similarly highlighted that most British voters are neither migration liberals nor inflexible migration rejectionists but instead occupy the “anxious middle”: ready to accept migration when the case in favour of it is clear, but also worried about the economic and social costs.³

A mix of pragmatism and a desire for reassurance about contributions and control can also be seen in English views of the positives and negatives of immigration. The most frequently raised concern about immigration, across all social groups and identity

tribes, was concern that immigrants could access benefits without paying in to the welfare system.

Fifty eight percent (58%) of English respondents raised this concern, including majorities of every social class, and of every identity “tribe”. Those from more sceptical or hostile tribes tended to go further, expressing concern that immigrants were getting preferential treatment from the welfare system. While only 25% of *confident multiculturals* worried about this, 40% of the *culturally concerned* and *latent hostile* groups did.

In this respect, David Cameron’s demands for reforms to restrict EU migrants’ access to some welfare benefits is entirely in line with public opinion, responding to a concern expressed even by the most liberal sections of English society. More broadly, it suggests that reform to the welfare system to make the contributory principle more visible and more explicit may be an important means to allay voters’ concerns about continued high immigration rates.⁴

When asked about the benefits of migration, the English again gravitate to economic pragmatism: 51% agree they are prepared to do jobs that natives won’t, and 37% that migrants work harder for lower pay than natives. The latter could be read as support for the migrant work ethic or anxiety about migrant competition. This dual meaning may explain why it is a more popular answer among both BAME respondents (45%) and the *culturally concerned* (45%). The more liberal identity segments – *confident multiculturals* and *mainstream liberals* – tend to take a more expansive view of migration’s benefits, highlighting economic dynamism and contributions to culture, but this broader understanding of the benefits from migration is not shared by other groups.

The English express a great deal of concern about the impact of immigration on public services: 78% believe that migration has added pressure to public services, including large majorities of every identity segment. Policymakers looking to build on the positive shift in the public mood would do well to start with addressing these concerns, for example by providing specifically earmarked funds to support services in communities experiencing large migration inflows.


However, a large part of the public also recognises the other side of the coin in this debate: 40% agree that many organisations, including in the public sector, couldn’t cope without immigrants. The views of the *culturally concerned* – a politically-vital group

II: Specific issues (continued)

Concerns about immigration

% of the two concerns that people have about immigration into Britain by ethnic and religious groups


1. Q25. Which two of the following, if any, most concern you about immigration into Britain? Base: all (4015)



Concerns about immigration

% of the two concerns different segments have about immigration


1. Q25. Which two of the following, if any, most concern you about immigration into Britain? Base: all (4015)



Benefits to immigration

% of the two benefits of immigration into Britain different segments mention

1. Q26. Which two of the following, if any, do you think are the biggest benefits of immigration into Britain? Base: all (4015)



for the governing Conservative party – are particularly interesting here. They line up with the hostile identity tribes in unanimous agreement that immigration is generating pressure on services, but break with the hostile tribes on the matter of migrants' contributions. While the hostile identity segments give this idea short shrift, 41% of the *culturally concerned* agree that migrant labour is vital for public services.

Anxieties about economic competition from immigrants have receded sharply overall since 2011, with the sharpest declines in the *anxious/hostile* segments where such worries are concentrated. Less than two percent (2%) of *confident multiculturals*, *mainstream liberals* or the *culturally concerned* are worried about immigrants putting their jobs at risk (down from an already low two-to-seven percent – 2-7% – in 2011). The share of *immigration ambivalents* worrying about migrant competition for jobs fell from 34% to 19% between 2011 and 2016; among *latent hostiles* the fall was from 47% to 27% while among the *active enmity* it was from 57% to 40%.

It is a similar story when we look at the impact of migrants on wages. Very few people in the *liberal/multicultural* or *culturally concerned* segments worry about this in either survey, while strong concerns in the more *anxious/hostile* segments have declined as the economic situation has improved. Forty four percent (44%) of *immigration ambivalents* worried about wage effects in 2011. This has now fallen to 37%. Among *latent hostiles* the figure has declined from 60% in 2011 to 51% now, while among *active enmity* the drop is from 73% to 67%. Thus even among the most anxious or hostile segments of English society, anxieties about immigrant competition in the labour market ebb and flow in line with overall economic conditions.

The English public's strong focus on economic contribution in assessing migrants impacts on their views about the current Syrian refugees' crisis.

There is not a straightforward economic case for accepting refugees, and it seems that the moral case for accepting refugees holds much less weight. While many politicians on the Left, and

activists in the migration sector, have argued that the Conservative government's pledge to take 20,000 Syrian migrants is inadequate given the scale of the crisis, the English public does not agree.

A plurality of 43% feel Britain has pledged to take too many, while 27% feel that the pledge is about the right number. Only 12% believe that the government's pledge is insufficient. There are big differences in opinion across the group, but the divide largely concerns whether the government is taking too many or about the right number.

The young, ethnic minorities, and the *liberal/multicultural* identity segments tend to think the government is taking the right number, while the old and the *anxious/hostile* identity segments believe Britain has pledged to take too many. Even in the most sympathetic sections of British society, politicians looking to make the case for greater action to help Syrian refugees face an uphill struggle.

NOTES


- 1 Ford, R and Goodwin, M (2014) *Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain* Abingdon: Routledge; Goodwin, M and Milazzo, C (2015) *UKIP: Inside the Campaign To Redraw the Map of British Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- 2 Ford, R and Heath, A (2014) "Immigration: a nation unevenly divided" in *British Social Attitudes: the 31st Report* (London: NatCen); Ford, R; Morrell, G and Heath, A (2012) "Fewer but better? British attitudes to immigration", in *British Social Attitudes: the 29th Report* (London: NatCen)
- 3 Katwala, S; Ballinger, S and Rhodes, M (2015) "How to talk about immigration" (London: British Future) <http://www.britishfuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/How-To-Talk-About-Immigration-FINAL.pdf>
- 4 Byrne, L (2012) "A William Beveridge for this century's welfare state" <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/02/beveridge-welfare-state-labour-revolution> O'Leary, D (2013) "Something for something: restoring a contributory principle to the welfare state", London: Demos

II: Specific issues (continued)

Statements about immigrants

% agreeing and disagreeing with statements about immigrants


1. Q34. Whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about new immigrants? Base: all (4015)



Statements about immigrants

% of different segments agreeing with different statements about immigrants

1. Q34. Whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about new immigrants? Base: all (4015)




Syria and the UK response to the migrant crisis

% saying whether the amount of Syrian refugees is too many, about the right amount or too few by demographic

1. Q33. In response to the crisis in Syria the government has given over £1.1 billion since 2012 to more than 30 implementing partners (from the UN to the Red Cross) in order to aid those affected by the conflict in the region. With that in mind, do you think the number of refugees the government has pledged to take over the next five years (20,000) is too many, too few, or about the right amount. Base: all (4015)

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


Syria and the UK response to the migrant crisis

% saying whether the amount of Syrian refugees is too many, about the right amount or too few by segment

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II: Specific issues (continued)

3. MULTICULTURALISM AND INTEGRATION

KEY POINTS

- The English favour a “laissez-faire” interpretation of multiculturalism: they support celebrating diversity and making minorities feel welcome, but oppose altering British laws to accommodate minority communities’ practices and beliefs.
- The English are divided over whether multiculturalism means that minority communities should be able to separate themselves ‘out’ from society: the more *liberal/multicultural* identity segments, ethnic minorities and Muslims support this idea; the more *anxious/hostile* identity segments do not.
- There is growing support for restrictions on free speech to protect racial and religious minorities. Sixty one percent (61%) of English respondents supported legally enforceable limits on racially intolerant speech (up from 58% in 2011); 46% supported similar limits on religiously intolerant speech (up from 40%). Support for such limits is highest among the young and *liberal/multicultural* segments.
- The English are deeply divided over whether Britain has become too tolerant of different cultures and beliefs. *Liberal/multicultural* segments and ethnic minorities strongly reject this notion, while *anxious/hostile* segments and older whites enthusiastically endorse it.
- The English are generally positive about life in a diverse society. Sixty percent (60%) believe variety is important for culture rather than undermining it (up from 49% in 2011)
- The English feel more positive about relations between ethnic groups than in 2011: forty one percent (41%) believe different ethnic groups get on well, up from 29% in 2011. Fifty one percent (51%) believe British Muslims are well integrated into society.
- The English support a wide range of more active integration policies targeted at Muslim immigrant communities. Seventy nine percent (79%) support measures to ensure all Muslim immigrants speak English; 70% support the active promotion of British values in Muslim communities; and 70% support closer monitoring of faith schools, including Muslim faith schools. All of these measures enjoy majority support from every major segment of English society, including from English Muslims.

Around the time our first identity survey went into the field in 2011, David Cameron launched a strong attack on “state multiculturalism”, saying that past governments had “failed to provide a common vision of society” and, as a result “tolerated... segregated communities behaving in ways which run counter to our values”.

Sustained criticism of past multicultural policies, and commitment to a more active integration agenda – which Cameron dubbed “muscular liberalism”¹ – became a keynote of Conservative policy in the 2010-15 Coalition government. Senior figures in government, such as the Home Secretary Theresa May² and Communities Secretary Eric Pickles³, continued this criticism of multiculturalism.

UKIP leader Nigel Farage has been an even more strident critic outside of government: for example, blaming the January 2015 terror attacks in Paris on multiculturalism policies which he called “the biggest mistake [European] governments have made”⁴. On the Left, the “blue Labour” movement associated with Lord Maurice Glasman argued that an emphasis on immigration and multicultural values risked marginalising the traditional working class values of community and solidarity on which the Labour movement was built.⁵

Britain’s political elites, then, have turned in various ways against multiculturalism. But how do the English public view the matter? Do they have a clear sense of what multiculturalism entails? Do they, like Mr Cameron and Mr Farage, regard it as a failure? Do they support a more robust “muscular liberal” approach to integration and the promotion of British values?


We start with the issue of definitions. Multiculturalism is a vague and abstract term and has been defined in a range of ways, some restrictive and “laissez-faire”, others more expansive and demanding. The more minimal view – or “soft” multiculturalism – looks for recognition, respect or celebration of different cultural and religious traditions. The more expansive or “hard” multiculturalism approach calls for tolerance of groups who wish to separate themselves out from mainstream society, or goes even further, arguing for the alteration of national laws to accommodate cultural and religious minorities.

The English lean towards a “soft” or “laissez-faire” understanding of multiculturalism, though not overwhelmingly. A large minority also endorses a more expansive interpretation. Large majorities endorse ideas of multiculturalism as either simply welcoming the presence of diverse groups (68%) or welcoming diverse groups while maintaining a clear sense of British identity (67%). Both of these interpretations are supported by large majorities from all age groups, and majorities of all identity segments except the most hostile and disaffected *active enmity* group. Nearly half of respondents also agree to a more expansive interpretation of multiculturalism as being comfortable with different communities living segregated lives according to their values and traditions (provided they lived within the law). A majority of the young and the liberal/multicultural segments back this interpretation, which is also more popular with ethnic minorities and Muslims.

Definitions of multiculturalism in the UK

% agreeing with different definitions of what multiculturalism means in the UK by segment

1. Q28. The term 'multiculturalism' means different things to different people. Do you agree or disagree with each of the following descriptions of the term 'multiculturalism'? Base: all (4015)



While many English people are willing to consider a degree of self-segregation by minority communities, provided they remain within the law, they firmly reject the “hard” multicultural approach of changing laws in order to accommodate the practices of diverse communities. Less than one in five agree with this definition, and in many cases this endorsement may be a negative one. The popularity of this definition with, for example, the *latent hostile*


and *active enmity* identity segments suggest many may agree with this description as a summary of why they (and perhaps others) dislike and reject multiculturalism.

When we ask directly about religion and the law, we find further evidence that the English reject “hard” multiculturalism. A large majority (73%) agree that religion should not influence laws and policies in Britain – including majorities of all age groups

Attitudes towards the influence of religion in the UK

% agreeing with statements on the place of religion in the UK

Religion should not influence laws and policies in this country




1. Q27. How much do you agree with each of these statements? Base: all 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)

Attitudes towards the influence of religion in the UK

% agreeing with statements on the place of religion in the UK by segment

Religion should not influence laws and policies in this country




1. Q27. How much do you agree with each of these statements? Base: all 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)

II: Specific issues (continued)

Free speech, race and religion

% agreeing with opposing statements on free speech in relation to race and religion


1. Q35. For each of these pairs of statements please say which one you agree with most, even if you don't fully agree with either? Base: all 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)



Free speech, race and religion

% agreeing with opposing statements on free speech in relation to race and religion by segment


1. Q35. For each of these pairs of statements please say which one you agree with most, even if you don't fully agree with either? Base: all (4015)



Statements about multiculturalism

% agreeing with opposing statements about multiculturalism in 2011 and 2016

1. Q22. Please say which of these pairs of statements you most agree with, even if you don't agree with either entirely. Base: all 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)



and identity segments, and majorities of BAME respondents and Muslims. The English view of multiculturalism is thus a nuanced one: they support the project to recognise and celebrate diversity and difference, and many are even willing to go further in accepting the segregation of some minority communities. But the English draw the line at changing the basic rules of society to accommodate diversity: they insist on a “common core” of laws and values which all must adhere to, and which should not be changed to accommodate religious or communal demands.

The English are, however, more supportive about laws designed to protect threatened minorities rather than to respect religious or ethnic sensitivities. A large majority of our English respondents (61%) support legally-enforced limits to free speech on the issue of race, and almost half (46%) also agree to similar limits to free speech on religion. In both cases, support for limiting free speech to respect multicultural sensitivities has grown over the past five years.

A look at how these attitudes break down by age and identity segment offers a hint as to why support is growing.

Limiting free speech is most popular among the young and in the growing *confident multicultural* identity segment. There is a strong age gradient in support for legally prosecuting racial and religious hate speech. Over two thirds of 18-24 and 25-34 year-olds back legally enforced limits on speech about race. A majority (58%) of under 25s also back similar limits on religion, as do nearly half (49%) of 25-34 year-olds. Pensioners are much more sceptical about limiting speech: 45% oppose doing so on the topic of race, while 61% oppose limiting free speech on religion.

The issue of limiting free speech divides our identity segments. Majorities in the two *liberal/multicultural* segments support both forms of free speech limitation. Three quarters back legal limits on race speech, and over half back limits on speech about religion. Large majorities of the two *anxious/hostile* segments, by contrast, reject both: around six in 10 believe people should be free to say what they want on the issue of race, and over two-thirds back unrestricted speech on religion.

The English public are also very divided over the claim that multiculturalism has gone too far. The idea has a lot of support: 46% agree that the UK is too tolerant of different cultures and beliefs, while only 28% actively reject it (another 27% are on the fence). However, the idea deeply splits the country's ethnic groups and identity tribes.

Nearly half (48%) of white voters support this argument. However, just 28% of BAME and 18% of Muslim voters support it. The multicultural and mainstream liberal segments of the population reject the notion of excessive tolerance by similarly large margins (19% and 20% support it), while the *latent hostile* and *active enmity* segments both strongly agree with it (81% and 75%). Crucially, perhaps, for the Conservative leaders making this argument, a majority (52%) of their key swing – the *culturally concerned* – agree with this argument.

While the English want clear limits on the scope of multiculturalism, they are fairly positive about living in a diverse society, and becoming more so, despite the downbeat mood among political elites.

When offered the choice between the statements “variety is important for culture” and “variety undermines culture”, 60% opt for the positive option (up from 49% in 2011). A majority of 53% (up from 50% in 2011) say there is a “place for everyone in the UK” rather than that “some people are too different to fit in”.

Views on relations between ethnic groups are rather more negative, but improving: while only 41% believe “different ethnic groups get on well”, this is up sharply from 29% in 2011. Breaking these views down by age, ethnicity and identity segment reveals a now familiar pattern: the young, ethnic minorities and *liberal/multicultural* segments are more positive, while pensioners and the *anxious/hostile* segments tend towards pessimism.




The Conservative desire to pursue more active integration policies is also backed by the English public, who are supportive of a wide range of initiatives on this front, some making demands of minority groups, while others help to support them and combat intolerance.

II: Specific issues (continued)

Statements about multiculturalism

% agreeing with opposing statements about multiculturalism by segment



■ Agree with statement on the left ■ Agree with statement on the right



1. Q22. Please say which of these pairs of statements you most agree with, even if you don't agree with either entirely. Base: all (4015)

Anti-extremism initiatives: biggest role

% saying which initiative should play the biggest role in defeating extremism in communities in 2011 and 2016




- Campaigns supported by prominent people from different backgrounds
- People in communities with extremists working together with the Police
- Children going to schools where there is a mixture of children from different backgrounds
- Community organisations that get people from different backgrounds together
- Controlling and limiting immigration

1. Q45. Which of these things do you think can play the biggest role in defeating extremism in communities? 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)

Support and opposition to integration initiatives

% supporting or opposing measures to help the successful integration of Muslim communities into wider British society


1. Q44. To what extent would you support or oppose each of the following measures to help the successful integration of Muslim communities into wider British society? Base: all (4015)



Support for integration initiatives

% supporting measures to help the successful integration of Muslim communities into wider British society by age, ethnic and religious group

1. Q44. To what extent would you support or oppose each of the following measures to help the successful integration of Muslim communities into wider British society? Base: all (4015)



II: Specific issues (continued)

When asked about initiatives to improve the integration of Muslim communities, large majorities backed measures to ensure all Muslim immigrants speak English (79%), the active promotion of British values in Muslim communities (70%) and closer monitoring of faith schools, including Muslim faith schools (70%). All of these measures also won majority support from BAME Britons and from English Muslims.

Measures focusing on support for Muslim communities are rather less popular, but still attract a lot of people: 48% back a high profile campaign against anti-Muslim hatred, and 47% back more positive media coverage of Islam and Muslim communities. Both measures win strong support from the young, minority communities and the liberal identity segments, but are opposed by pensioners, blue collar workers and the *hostile* identity segments.

However, despite widespread support for more active efforts to promote Muslim integration, the English are not as pessimistic about the integration of Muslim communities as some in government and the media. A majority of English respondents (51%) agree that Muslim immigrants have successfully integrated into British society, while only 22% disagree with this idea.

A recurring theme in our findings is that the English are willing to accommodate and make compromises, but they expect the process to be mutual, and not too costly. The English view of multiculturalism and integration fits this general pattern. Most English people support a multicultural politics of recognition which treats ethnic and religious diversity as something which should be valued and supported. Many are willing to place limits on free speech in order to accommodate racial and religious sensitivities and promote harmony between groups. But the English also insist that all groups accept a common set of laws, which they believe should not be altered to accommodate religious or cultural sensitivities.

While diversity is something to be celebrated, for most English people (including those from BAME and Muslim communities) a common British identity, built around laws, values and a common language, is important.

NOTES

1 Cameron, D (2011) "Radicalisation and Islamic Extremism", speech to Munich security conference. Full transcript: <http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/02/terrorism-islam-ideology>

2 May, T (2014) "Speech on Terrorism and Extremism", <http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2014/09/theresa-mays-speech-on-terrorism-and-extremism-full-text-and-audio/>

3 Pickles, E (2013) "Uniting our communities: integration in 2013"

4 RealClearPolitics.com (2015) "UKIP's Nigel Farage: "Multiculturalism the biggest mistake the governments have made" http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/01/08/ukips_nigel_farage_multiculturalism_the_biggest_mistake_the_governments_have_made.html

5 Glasman, M; Rutherford, J; Stears, M and White, S (2011) "The Labour Tradition and the Politics of Paradox", Oxford London Seminars e-Book

4. RACE & RELIGION

KEY POINTS

- 75% of English people believe religious abuse is increasing, up from 71% in 2011. This is above the 62% share who believe racial abuse is rising (down from 64%).
- 38% of English people now regard religious abuse as more widespread than racial abuse, up from 28% in 2011
- Muslims are regarded as a uniquely different and problematic religious minority. 43% of English respondents think Muslims are “completely different” from them, much higher than the figure for other religious minorities. 45% believe they cause problems in Britain and 59% believe they cause problems in the world.
- However, concern about problems caused by Muslims and other religious groups is much lower now than it was in 2011.
- The English are deeply divided over whether Muslims cause problems. The liberal/multicultural and immigration ambivalent identity segments – who constitute half of the population in total – do not regard Muslims as problematic. However, a large majority in the culturally concerned and anxious/hostile segments who comprise the other half of the population believe Muslims generate a lot of problems
- Despite their concerns about Muslims, the English reject arguments which stigmatise all British Muslims, and worry about the effects of discrimination and negative media portrayals. (78% agreed that it would be wrong to blame an entire religion for the actions of a few extremists; 57% agree discrimination is a serious problem for British Muslims and 38% agreed Muslims are portrayed too negatively by the media (only 26% disagreed).

Over the past fifteen years, Muslims have become the focus of public anxiety about diversity and cultural change. Many have expressed concerns that Muslims' religious and social values are at odds with the values of the majority, that Muslim minorities are failing to integrate into society, and that a minority of extremist Muslims pose a direct threat to national security. As such concerns have risen, other racial divides have fallen into the background. Racism against black and Asian Britons has been in slow but steady decline for decades¹ but Muslims face much greater hostility² suggesting they are being singled out as a uniquely problematic “pariah” group³.

This shift away from race and racism to religion and Islamophobia is reflected in our survey data. 75% of the English believe religious abuse is increasing, up from 71% in 2011, and well above the 62% who believe racial abuse is increasing (down from 64% in 2011). Racial abuse is still regarded by most (62%) as more widespread than religious abuse (38%), but the share regarding religious abuse as the bigger problem is up 10 points on 2011. Nearly two thirds of English people now believe religious abuse is as serious as racial abuse, up from 62% in 2011. There is a strong age gradient to these attitudes – the under 35's, who have grown up in the post 9/11 era, are much more concerned about religious abuse than older cohorts.

This concern about religious abuse is clearly focused on Muslims, who are perceived as a uniquely distinct and problematic religious minority. We asked people their views on five religious groups – Christians, Jews, Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims. Muslims were consistently regarded differently to the other religious groups. When asked which groups cause problems in the world, 59% say Muslims cause “some” or “a lot”, over three times the level of concern reported with any other group. When asked whether religious groups cause problems in Britain, Muslims are again singled out: 45% believe Muslims are a source of problems, nearly triple the level of concern reported with any of the other religious groups. However, while many English clearly have concerns about Muslims, the level of concern about problems generated by Muslims (and by other religious groups) is down sharply on 2011, in keeping with the general picture of a less anxious England emerging from other questions.

Concern about Muslims is not evenly distributed across English society. In fact, we can divide England into two halves: the half that worries about Muslims, and the half that does not. Relatively few people (7-23%) in the confident multicultural, mainstream liberal or immigrant ambivalent segments (52% of the total) worry about problems generated by Muslims, while in the culturally concerned, latent hostile and active enmity segments the level of concern runs from 70 to 92%.


A similar combination of attitudes emerges when we ask people how similar or different they feel to different religious groups. People express a greater sense of similarity to Christians than to any of the minority religions, but Muslims are regarded as much more different by respondents than Sikhs, Jews or Hindus. 43% rated themselves as “completely different” to Muslims, well above the 21-29% figure for the other minority religions. As before, it is

II: Specific issues (continued)

How serious and widespread is religious and racial abuse

% agreeing with opposing statements on how serious and widespread religious and racial abuse is in Britain by age


1. Q35. For each of these pairs of statements please say which one you agree with most, even if you don't fully agree with either? Base: all (4015)



Which groups create problems in the UK and the World

% saying ethnic and religious groups create a lot or quite a lot of problems in the UK and the world in 2011 and 2016


1. Q32. Please indicate how far the following groups create problems in the UK and the world? Base: all 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)



Which groups create problems in the UK

% saying ethnic and religious groups create a lot or quite a lot of problems in the UK and the world by segment

1. Q32. Please indicate how far the following groups create problems in the UK and the world?
Base: all (4015)



the culturally concerned and the hostile segments who express the highest level of separation from Muslims – virtually no one in these groups regards Muslims as similar to them. However, even the more liberal segments of British society tend to regard Muslims as rather different to them – only 21% of confident multiculturals and 16% of mainstream liberals consider Muslims “similar”.


While English perceptions of Muslims, and to a lesser extent other religious minorities, as different doubtless partly reflects stereotypes and prejudices, there is also an underlying grain of truth to them. Religious minority groups *are* unusual in England, because people in these groups tend to regard religion as an important part of their personal lives and a force for social good.

Similarity to different religious groups


% saying ethnic and religious groups are similar to them

1. Q29. What extent you think the following groups are similar to you in terms of habits, customs and values? Base: all (4015)

[4-5 on a 1-5 scale where five is completely the same and 1 is completely different]



II: Specific issues (continued)



England is one of the most secularised societies in the world, and for most people religion is just not a regular part of their lives – most seldom attend churches outside of special ceremonial occasions, do not take active part in religious organisations and most do not see religion as an important part of their lives. A growing minority report no religious belief of any kind. In such a society, the values and priorities of religious minorities are likely to come into conflict with those of the majority, as the chart above illustrates. Just 18% of white English respondents say religion is personally important to them, and only 21% believe religion is a force for good in the UK. Religion is far more central in the lives of BAME and Muslim English – 54% of BAME and 80% of Muslim respondents say religion is personally important to them, while 39% of BAME English and 49% of Muslim English regard religion as a force for good in the country. Bridging the gap in understanding between a white majority who regard religion with indifference or suspicion and minorities who see it as a powerful source of personal and social value will be one of the key integration challenges in coming years.

A look at the age breakdown of attitudes provides some cause for optimism that the gap can be bridged over time. There is a strong age divide in views about Muslims, reflecting the very different

levels of ethnic diversity at different points in time and among different age cohorts. Older English voters grew up in a more homogenous society, which has left its mark on their attitudes and their social networks. They are more likely to regard Muslims as different and problematic, and less likely to have regular contact with Muslims. Young English adults, by contrast, are much more likely to experience diversity in their everyday life and have grown up in a national context where racial and religious diversity is more visible and accepted. We find this age divide in all attitudes about Muslims – the above chart illustrates three. Less than a quarter of under 25s say that Muslims are completely different to them, or that Muslims create a lot of problems in the UK, while 27% say they do not know any Muslims well. By contrast, more than half of English pensioners think Muslims are completely different to them and cause problems, while nearly two thirds say they do not know Muslims well. Many of the current anxieties about Muslims are concentrated in sections of English society who have very little contact with Muslims, and for whom the establishment and growth of a British Muslim community is an alien and threatening phenomenon.


Although Muslims have clearly become the focal point for public and political debates about diversity and integration, the public recognise the complexity of the issue. Thus, while 75% of English respondents agreed that Muslim communities needed to do more to combat the threat of extremism, an even higher proportion (78%) agreed that it would be wrong to blame an entire religion for the actions of a few extremists. The English clearly distinguish between Islam and Islamic extremism in general, where they have negative views, and the British Muslim community, which is seen in a more positive light. 56% of respondents agreed that Islam was a serious threat to Western civilisation, but 51% agreed that British Muslims were well integrated (only 22% disagreed) and 57% agreed that discrimination was a serious problem for Muslims in Britain (12% disagreed). Many English voters also believe Muslims are unfairly portrayed in the media – 38% agreed that the media is too negative towards Muslims, while only 26% rejected this statement. Mainstream politicians in Britain and elsewhere regularly emphasise that the vast majority of Muslims are law abiding citizens who reject extremism and embrace British values – our evidence suggest that the majority of English voters take the same view.

NOTES

- 1 Ford, R (2008) "Is racial prejudice declining in Britain?" *British Journal of Sociology*
- 2 Storm, I, Sobolewska, M and Ford, R (2016) "Is Ethnic Prejudice Declining in Britain? Change in social distance among ethnic majority and minority Britons", working paper.
- 3 Modood, T (2005) *Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain* Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press; Saggat, S (2009) *Pariah Politics: Understanding Radical Western Islamism and What is To Be Done*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Spotlight on Muslims

% who don't know Muslims, sense of difference, think Muslims create problems (by age)




1. Q29. What extent you think the following groups are similar to you in terms of habits, customs and values? Base: all (4015)
2. Q30. How often do you personally come into contact with people from the following groups? Base: all (4015)
3. Q32a. Please indicate how far the following groups create problems in the UK? Base: all (4015)

Statements about Muslims


% agreeing or disagreeing with the statements about Muslims

1. Q41. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the integration of Muslim communities into wider British society? Base: all (4015)




PROFILE: BAME AND MUSLIMS


Identity – defining yourself




Feeling when they see the St George's flag being flown




Values




Economics




Multiculturalism




Immigration




Concerns about immigration (% of the two most mentioned)




Benefits of immigration (% of the two most mentioned)



Best immigration policy for the country




Anti-extremism initiatives: biggest role




PROFILE: MUSLIMS


Religion




Statements about Muslims – agree




When you see or hear that Muslims are increasingly associated with violence and terrorism, what is your immediate reaction?




When you see or hear reports of violence between English nationalist extremists on the one hand and Muslim extremists on the other, where would you say your sympathies lie?



Support for integration initiatives



A new campaign group that is going to be set up which says it wants to campaign against religious and racial extremism, and promote better relations between ethnic and religious groups




Which of these things do you think can play the biggest role in defeating extremism in communities?

Community organisations that work to bring people from different backgrounds together so they can get to know one another



Campaigns supported by prominent people from different backgrounds to show people that those from different backgrounds aren't actually different to them



Children going to schools where there is a mixture of children from different backgrounds



People working together with the Police if they live in communities where there are extremists



Controlling and limiting immigration



0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

II: Specific issues (continued)

5. IDENTITY DIVIDES IN POLITICS

KEY POINTS

- UKIP's support is very concentrated in the anxious/hostile identity segment – 68% of UKIP supporters are in the culturally concerned or latent hostile segments, which make up 40% of the overall sample
- The English have become less willing to support an “English nationalist” party. Thirty nine percent (39%) said they were willing to support a new party focused on defending the English, opposing immigration, challenging Islamic extremism, restricting the building of mosques. This is down from 48% in 2011. Forty seven percent (47%) said they would oppose such a party, up from 42% in 2011
- The English have also become less willing to back campaigns against the building of a mosque in their local area. Thirty four percent (34%) said they would back such a campaign, down from 43% in 2011. A further 28% would oppose a local anti-mosque campaign, up from 19% in 2011
- The identity segments take very different views on the EU and the upcoming referendum. The liberal/multicultural segments are positive about the EU, particularly on security and leadership, and lean strongly towards “remain”. The anxious/hostile segments are very negative about the EU – particularly on immigration – and lean very strongly towards “leave”.
- The concerned/ambivalent identity segments are more divided, and could be swing voters in the EU referendum. The culturally concerned segment is evenly divided on both pro- and anti-EU arguments, but is negative about immigration and currently leans slightly towards Brexit. The immigration ambivalent segment is unconvinced by any of the arguments for or against the EU, and has the highest concentration of completely undecided voters.

A. THE RISE OF UKIP – VOICE OF THE ANXIOUS ENGLISH?


The most significant political development in England since our 2011 survey has been the surge in support for UKIP. When our first survey fielded, UKIP averaged around two to three percent in most opinion polls, and was largely regarded by mainstream politicians as an eccentric minority.

Five years later, the party routinely wins the support of 15% or more of the English electorate in opinion polls¹ and elections (including the 2015 general election)², has hundreds of incumbent local councillors and a Westminster MP. How does the biggest change in English political preferences for a generation relate to identity politics?

UKIP support has a very clear profile in identity terms. Virtually none of the party's voters come from the *confident multicultural* or *mainstream liberal* segments – these make up 32% of the overall sample, but only five percent of UKIP supporters. The *immigration ambivalence* segment is also under-represented in UKIP. Despite this group's concerns about immigration, a core UKIP theme, only 11% are UKIP voters (though 20% of overall respondents to the survey fall into this segment).

The vast majority of UKIP support comes instead from the identity segments which express either strong anxiety or outright hostility to immigration and cultural change: the *culturally concerned*, *latent*

UKIP – Political affiliation by segment



1. Q361. Which of the following political parties do you most identify yourself with, even if you don't identify with any of them entirely? Base: all 2016 (4015), 2011 (5054)

New political parties


% saying they would support or not support new parties that were set up for differing reasons

1. Q37. A new party is going to be set up which says it wants to defend the English, ... Would you: Base: all (4015)
 2. Q.38 A new campaign group is going to be set up which says it wants to campaign against religious and racial extremism... Would you: Base: all (4015)

Support it Don't know Not support it

A new party is going to be set up which says it wants to defend the English, create an English Parliament, control immigration, challenge Islamic extremism, restrict the building of mosques and make it compulsory for all public buildings to fly the St George's flag or Union Jack. Would you:

A new campaign group is going to be set up which says it wants to campaign against religious and racial extremism, and promote better relations between ethnic and religious groups in England. Would you:



Anti-Mosque campaign and violence

% supporting or opposing statements about an anti-Mosque campaign and violence associated with it


1. Q39. If there was a proposal...: Base: all (4015)
 2. Q40. And regardless of whether...: Base: all (4015)

If there was a proposal to build a new mosque near where you live and some local residents began a campaign to stop it, do you think you would...

And regardless of whether you would support or oppose the building of the mosque or the campaign to stop it, if either side became violent or threatened violence, would this make you reconsider your view?

Oppose the campaign to stop the Mosque
 Neither support nor oppose
 Support the campaign to stop the Mosque

Violence is unacceptable and I wouldn't support those involved
 The issue is so serious you have to support one side or the other



II: Specific issues (continued)

hostiles and *active enmity* segments. What particularly sets UKIP apart from all the mainstream parties is its strong support from the latter two segments: the groups with the greatest anxiety about their own group identity, the greatest opposition to cultural change, and the greatest hostility to minority groups. While much has been written about the role of immigration and political disaffection as drivers of UKIP support, our analysis points to something deeper: UKIP has mobilised a very distinct form of identity politics among the English. As a result, it can be considered, at least in part, a political voice for the anxious English who regard the rapid cultural change of recent decades as a threat to be opposed.

UKIP's supporters are drawn from a clearly defined part of the identity politics spectrum, and hold distinctive views on most of the issues asked about in our survey, as the table above illustrates. They are pessimists across the board: pessimistic about themselves, about the country, about British values and about social change.

They are deeply worried about immigration, with nearly 90% regarding it as bad for the country as a whole, though the portion who see it as harmful to their local community is somewhat lower (57%). UKIP voters worry in particular about the cultural effects of immigration and rising diversity. A large proportion of UKIP voters believe immigrants do not want to integrate, that some people are just too different to "fit in" and that diversity is undermining British culture.

Muslims are a particular focus of concern for these people: 80% believe Muslims create problems in the UK, and 53% believe Islam is a dangerous religion which incites violence. UKIP supporters are willing to act on such anxieties: 65% would join a campaign to prevent the building of a mosque in their local area, and 59% would side with English nationalists in any confrontation with Muslim extremists.

A quite distinct form of English nationalism – defensive, anxious and potentially confrontational – is prominent among UKIP supporters. However, UKIP is probably a more benign and constructive political outlet for this kind of nationalism than other recent expressions such as the British National Party or the England Defence League. UKIP's rise to prominence also does not seem to have stoked up general tensions on immigration and identity issues: in fact, attitudes are more positive and less polarised on many of the most contentious issues in our survey in 2016 than they were in 2011, before UKIP's rise.

B. EXTREMISM (& FIGHTING IT)

The idea that the rise of UKIP may be helpful in the fight against extremism, by providing a legitimate political outlet for anxieties that might otherwise be channelled into more violent or dangerous political projects, finds some support in our polling data.

In both 2011 and 2016, we asked our respondents if they would consider supporting a new political party with an assertive, English nationalist agenda (defending the English, opposing immigration, challenging Islamic extremism, restricting the building of mosques and so on). Support for such a party is

much lower now than it was five years ago: 39% say they would support such a party (down from 48%), while 47% say they would oppose it (up from 42%).

Significantly, support for such a notional English nationalist party is far higher among UKIP supporters: 85% say they would back it. Yet this suggests that such a group would now find it harder to get off the ground, as its most natural supporters are already aligned with an existing political party.

A similar pattern emerges when we asked respondents whether they would support a campaign to stop the building of a mosque in their local area.

Over a third of respondents said they would support such a campaign, a potent illustration of the prevalence of anxiety about Islam. However, this is sharply lower than the level of support expressed five years ago (43%), while the share of people opposed to such a campaign is sharply higher: 28% in 2016, compared to 19% in 2011. In 2011, supporters of an anti-mosque campaign outnumbered opponents two-to-one. By 2016, the groups were almost equal in size, suggesting that while anxieties about Muslims remain, for many they are no longer intense enough to justify backing illiberal campaigns against religious buildings.

The issue of local mosques is a polarising one, dividing people along generational, class, ethnic and identity politics fault lines.

Supporters of an anti-mosque campaign outnumber opponents roughly two-to-one among the over 55s, while opponents outnumber supporters by the same ratio among the under 25s. Anti-mosque campaigns are much more popular among the working classes than the middle classes, and among white voters than among ethnic minorities (English Muslims are, unsurprisingly, strongly opposed).


When we look at the identity "tribes", we find an interesting asymmetry. The *anxious/hostile* tribes are very willing to actively support a local anti-mosque campaign, but the *liberal/multicultural* tribes are less willing to actively oppose one. Large majorities of both the *latent hostile* (64%) and *active enmity* segments (70%) would actively support a local anti-mosque campaign, as would 45% of the *culturally concerned*. The liberals, by contrast, divide more evenly between active opposition and indifference: just 42% of the most liberal *confident multicultural* segment would actively oppose the anti-mosque campaign, while another 48% would avoid taking sides either way. The story is the same for the *mainstream liberal* and *immigration ambivalent* segments. While few would support an anti-mosque campaign, most prefer inaction to active opposition.

This difference in intensity of feeling is also visible when we ask people what their reactions would be if a local campaign turned violent. The vast majority of respondents – 81% – regarded violence as unacceptable, and majorities of every identity segment rejected the use of violence. However, there was considerably greater willingness to stick with a campaign, even if it turned violent, among the *anxious/hostile* identity segments. Thirty five percent (35%) of *latent hostiles* and 47% of *active enmity* expressed a willingness to stick with a violent campaign.

Anti-extremism initiatives: biggest role

% saying which initiative should play the biggest role in defeating extremism in communities by age and ethnic and religious group

1. Q45. Which of these things do you think can play the biggest role in defeating extremism in communities? (4015)




While public support for campaigns against mosques is ebbing away, support for campaigns to fight racial and religious extremism is rising. Nearly seven in 10 respondents in our poll said they would support a new campaign to fight racial and religious extremism, and promote better relations between

ethnic and religious groups, up from 64% in 2011. Only 19% said they would not support such a campaign. An anti-extremism campaign wins majority support from every segment of society, including overwhelming backing from the young and ethnic minorities.

Statements on the EU

% agreeing with statements about staying in or leaving the EU by segment

1. Q48. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding Britain's relationship with the EU? Base: all (4015)



II: Specific issues (continued)

People become more divided when presented with initiatives to defeat extremism. We presented people with five scenarios: halting immigration, using community organisations to bring groups together, diversity in schools, closer co-operation with the police, and campaigns supported by people from a range of different backgrounds. The most negative identity segments – *latent hostile* and *active enmity* – focused overwhelmingly on a single solution: controlling immigration. While this is a minority view overall, backed by 34% of respondents, it is the most popular single option, and wins considerable support from the *concerned/ambivalent* segments, where around a third of respondents also back it.

The anxieties expressed by Home Secretary Theresa May, that very high immigration risks harming community cohesion and encouraging extremism³, are widely shared by the English public. However, the majority of English voters who fall outside the *anxious/hostile* segments accept that lower immigration is not the whole solution. Efforts to promote better links between groups through community organisations and schools were all popular, particularly with *liberal identity* segments and the young, while Muslims themselves were keenest on campaigns supported by people from a range of different backgrounds.

C. IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE EU REFERENDUM

In June 2016, the British will vote for the first time in a generation on whether they wish to remain part of the European Union. Identity politics will be at the heart of the debate over Britain's future in Europe. Recent analysis by John Curtice revealed that cultural concerns, such as the belief that the EU is undermining Britain's distinct identity, are the strongest predictor of both negative views of the EU and support for Brexit⁴. How do the identity "tribes" in our survey feel about the EU, and the coming referendum on membership?

The different identity segments have very distinct views about the EU. The *liberal/multicultural* groups tend to be very positive about EU membership, placing a particular emphasis on the opportunities it provides for leadership and security. They are unconvinced by Eurosceptic arguments, in particular rejecting by a large margin the notion that Britain could be as prosperous outside the EU as within it.


Both of the *anxious/hostile* segments express very anti-EU attitudes across the board. They are particularly convinced by the argument that leaving the EU will enable Britain to "control the borders" – 82% of latent hostiles and 71% of active enmity

Voting intention: 100 point scale

% of people saying 60-100, 41-59, 0-40 on a scale of 0-100 where 100 means they definitely will vote for the UK to leave the EU and 0 means they definitely will vote for the UK to stay in the EU by segment

1. Q47. As you may know, the government is committed to holding a referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union before ... means "I am completely undecided". Base: all (4015)

Using a scale from 0 to 100, please indicate how likely you think you are to vote one way or the other, where "0" means "I will definitely vote for the UK to remain a member of the EU", and "100" means "I will definitely vote for the UK to leave the EU", and "50" means "I am completely undecided".



respondents agree. Large majorities also agree that Britain can be just as prosperous outside of the EU as inside it, but this is hardly decisive for them, as a similarly thumping majority also feel Britain should be free to govern itself outside the EU even if this means being economically worse off.

The two poles of the identity spectrum map quite well onto the two poles of the Europe debate: *multiculturals* are strongly Europhile, while the *anxious* and *hostile* reject Europe with equal vigour. The pivotal votes will most likely come from the more ambivalent middle ground best represented by the *culturally concerned* and *immigration ambivalent* identity segments. As table x below reveals, these two groups are both internally conflicted about the EU, but in very different ways.

The *culturally concerned* are attracted by some of the arguments for Brexit. Around half support the notion of a self-governing Britain, and two thirds believe leaving the EU would enable full control of the borders. However, many of them also agree with the arguments for “remain”: 49% agree that leaving the EU could create new security risks due to reduced co-operation, 47% agree that European countries can be more secure by sticking together in an uncertain world, and 44% believe Britain does best when leading within the EU. English voters in this group, then, are genuinely torn. They are sympathetic to both sides of the referendum argument: security appears to be a powerful point in favour of the EU for them, while ‘control’ – in particular control of the borders – is a persuasive point against it.

The *immigration ambivalents* are conflicted about the EU in a different way: most simply do not have strong opinions about it. Between 43% and 59% of this group expressed no opinion either way when presented with our six statements about the EU (well above the survey average). Most of the voters in this group, which includes many poorer blue collar workers and ethnic minorities, simply don't know or care very much about the EU and have not, as yet, formed strong views about its costs or benefits. Providing this potentially decisive segment of the electorate with basic information about what is at stake in the EU referendum, so they can make an informed choice, will be just as important as making them aware of the key arguments for “remain” and “leave”.

In order to get a more nuanced measure of referendum vote preferences, we asked our respondents to rate their preference on a 0-100 scale, where 0 equated to a definite vote for remain, 100 for a definite vote for leave and 50 for completely undecided. This measure revealed a referendum that is still very much up for grabs: 34% of respondents are firm or very firm for “remain”, 39% are firm or very firm for “leave” and 27% are undecided.

Breaking preferences down by identity segment, we find strong but not overwhelming support for “remain” in the *confident multicultural* (56% for remain) and *mainstream liberal* (49%) segments. Although “remainers” greatly outnumber “leavers” in these segments, a minority of around 20% in each would currently vote to leave the EU, while around a quarter are undecided at present.

Table: EU opinions of the “swing” identity groups – “culturally concerned” and “immigration ambivalent”.

	Culturally concerned	Immigration ambivalent	Overall sample
Leaving EU would enable us to take back full control of Britain's borders			
Agree	67	48	57
Disagree	11	9	15
Don't know/neither	22	43	28
<i>Net</i>	<i>+56</i>	<i>+39</i>	<i>+42</i>
In an uncertain world, European countries will be more secure by sticking together and promoting shared values			
Agree	47	34	47
Disagree	19	14	19
Don't know/neither	34	52	34
<i>Net</i>	<i>+28</i>	<i>+20</i>	<i>+28</i>
Britain can be just as prosperous outside the EU as within the EU			
Agree	52	37	44
Disagree	26	13	25
Don't know/neither	22	49	31
<i>Net</i>	<i>+26</i>	<i>+24</i>	<i>+19</i>
Leaving the EU would be a risk because we would lose the ability to cooperate on security and counter terrorism issues			
Agree	49	35	44
Disagree	27	18	27
Don't know/neither	24	47	39
<i>Net</i>	<i>+22</i>	<i>+17</i>	<i>+17</i>
Britain should be free to govern itself outside the EU even if it means the country will be economically worse off			
Agree	49	38	44
Disagree	26	12	23
Don't know/neither	25	50	23
<i>Net</i>	<i>+23</i>	<i>+26</i>	<i>+21</i>
Britain does best when it is a leading country within the EU			
Agree	44	30	41
Disagree	23	12	21
Don't know/neither	33	58	38
<i>Net</i>	<i>+21</i>	<i>+18</i>	<i>+20</i>


II: Specific issues (continued)

Likelihood to vote in referendum

% of people saying 7-10, 6-4, and 0-3 on a scale of 0-10 where 10 means they definitely will vote in the EU referendum and 0 means they definitely will vote in the EU referendum by demographic

1. Q46. Many people say they probably won't vote in the EU referendum when it comes. How likely do you think you are to vote? Base: all (4015)

Many people say they probably won't vote in the EU referendum when it comes. How likely do you think you are to vote, where 0 means "I definitely won't vote" and 10 means "I am certain to vote"?




Voting intention: 100 point scale

% of people saying 60-100, 41-59, 0-40 on a scale of 0-100 where 100 means they definitely will vote for the UK to leave the EU and 0 means they definitely will vote for the UK to stay in the EU by demographic

1. Q47. As you may know, the government is committed to holding a referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union before ... means "I am completely undecided". Base: all (4015)

Using a scale from 0 to 100, please indicate how likely you think you are to vote one way or the other, where "0" means "I will definitely vote for the UK to remain a member of the EU", and "100" means "I will definitely vote for the UK to leave the EU", and "50" means "I am completely undecided"



There is also some indecision at the other end of the identity spectrum. The larger *latent hostile* group is the most firmly decided identity segment: early seven in 10 are firmly in the “leave” camp, while just 13% back “remain”. However, even here nearly one voter in five has yet to firmly make up their mind. In the more deeply disaffected and hostile *active enmity* segment, support for leave is, surprisingly, less firm: 51% of people in this group are firmly for leave, but over a quarter intend to vote to remain in the EU, and another 23% have not made up their minds.

Firm votes for „leave“ outnumber firm votes for „remain“ in both of the „swing“ identity segments. The *culturally concerned* break 44/32 in favour of leave, while the *immigration ambivalent* break 35/26 in the same direction. However, many voters in both groups have yet to make up their minds: 23% of the *culturally concerned* have no firm opinion while no fewer than 39% of the *immigration ambivalents* are undecided, reflecting their very low level of knowledge about the EU.

The demographic breakdowns of support for “remain” and “leave”, and likelihood of voting in the referendum, reveal particular challenges for both campaigns.

There is a clear age gradient in support for the EU. Firm remainers outnumber firm leavers among the under 35s (by two-to-one among under 25s), while leavers outnumber remainers by large margins among the over 55s. But the young are much less certain to turn out: only around six in 10 rate themselves very likely to cast ballot (defined as seven or above on a 0-10 scale) while nearly 90% of pensioners say they are very likely to vote. We find a similar pattern in the ethnic breakdowns: BAME and Muslim English are keener on “remain” than the white majority, but are also less certain that they will vote.

The age and ethnic patterns of support deliver an advantage to “leave”, as its support comes from those older, white voters who are more likely to show up on polling day. Breaking things down by social class, however, reverses this pattern: “remain” is strongest among the professional middle class “AB” voters, who report a much higher likelihood of turning out than the blue collar “C2” and “DE” voters who break towards “leave”. It is a similar pattern with education (not shown in the charts): university graduates lean more towards “remain” and are more likely to vote than “leave” leaning school leavers.

Identity politics poses twin challenges for both sides in the coming referendum campaign. Each needs to firm up support in its core identity groups, winning over undecided voters with underlying sympathies to one side of the argument, and ensuring they turn out. However, both sides also need to win converts from the crucial swing identity segments. The *culturally concerned* segment is engaged but genuinely torn, expressing sympathies with both sides of the argument. The other, the *immigration ambivalents*, enters the campaign with very few formed opinions about the issues under debate. Between them, these groups make up 44% of the English respondents in our sample, so the ability of the campaigns to engage and persuade them could be decisive.

NOTES

- 1 Ford, R; Jennings, W; Pickup, M and Wlezien, C (2015) “Polling Observatory #1: Estimating support for the parties (with some trepidation...)” <http://sotonpolitics.org/2015/11/10/polling-observatory-1-some-trepidation/>
- 2 See Curtice, J; Fisher, S and Ford, R (2015) “Appendix 1: The Results Analysed” in Cowley, P and Kavanagh, D (2015) “The British General Election of 2015”, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan
- 3 May, T (2015) “Speech to the Conservative Party Conference on immigration”, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-s-speech-to-the-conservative-party-conference-in-full-a6681901.html>
- 4 Curtice, J (2016) “How Deeply Does Britain’s Euroscepticism Run?” <http://whatukthinks.org/eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Analysis-paper-5-How-deeply-does-Britains-Euroscepticism-run.pdf>

Conclusion: Towards a new consensus

There is much to cheer from this report. The attitudes of the English have become more positive, open and tolerant over the past five years. They are a lot more positive about the impact of immigration, more comfortable with multiculturalism and more supportive of action being taken to tackle racial and religious hate speech.

Even attitudes to Islam as a religion and Muslims as a group have improved. Whilst there is still a deep cultural gulf, the overwhelming majority of British people believe it is wrong to stigmatise a whole religious group for the actions of an extremist few.

That 18% of English people now fit into our Confident Multiculturalists tribe, up from 8% in 2011, and that together with Mainstream Liberals, almost a third of people are very comfortable with immigration and multiculturalism, is all the more remarkable given the wider political rhetoric and lurid media headlines we are now experiencing.

It is positively reassuring that so many ordinary people can ignore the increasingly negative discourse around race, migration and Islam.

As this report states clearly, much of this new found positivity is largely the result of an increased optimism about the state of the British economy. Our original Fear and HOPE survey found a very clear correlation between economic pessimism and fear of the outsider.

And so, as people perceive the economy improving, so attitudes towards the 'other' has softened. The massive increase in students in the Confident Multiculturalists tribe, up from 7% to 32%, is testament to this. Young people are naturally more open and tolerant but when faced with increased economic pressure, this is deemed by some as a luxury too far.

However, while there is certainly a lot to cheer in this report, there is no room for complacency. There remains widespread antipathy towards immigration from a significant section of society and the public view of Muslims is still very negative in many respects.

A quarter of the population remain firmly entrenched in the two tribes most hostile to immigration and multiculturalism, with another quarter showing cultural concerns about the impact on immigration on national identity and the willingness of immigrants to integrate. Then there is a further 20% who are less financially secure and view immigration through the prism of its economic impact on their opportunities and the social impact on their communities.

Altogether, that makes 68% of society – so there is clearly a lot to do.

This survey poses real questions for all the main political parties. For Labour, there is the continuing problem of combining the positive openness of a growing section of its supporters with the persistent pessimism of its blue collar working class base, which has been the only social group to see a significant increase in representation in the two anti-immigration tribes. Labour has been hemorrhaging support from working class communities for several years and it is hard to see how it can reconcile the two wings without a radical change of direction. But without these two blocs

of support, it is hard to see how Labour could ever hope to create a winning coalition.

Our survey shows how the Liberal Democrats has become increasingly populated by Confident Multiculturalists, up from 14% in 2011 to 30% today, which may have helped propel Tim Farron into the leadership. However, the shifting nature of its supporter base will make it even harder for the party to win back the seats it lost to the Conservatives at the last election. At the same time, with Labour under Jeremy Corbyn moving to a more open multicultural position, it is hard to see how the party will expand its base with this group in the short term.

This report has focused heavily on the profile of the UKIP supporter and explained how the rise of this nationalism and increasingly anti-immigrant party has provided a political voice for many people who felt previously excluded. As our survey has showed, this has acted as a safety valve for many, thus contributing to the sharp reduction in the numbers of people in our Active Enmity group. Our research is good and bad news for UKIP and its supporters. It clearly shows that whatever the party's current state in the polls, it has a significant seam of support to mine and, if anything, it still has potential to grow. However, as those most hostile to immigration have coalesced around UKIP, so they have become more detached from the political mainstream, reducing their ability to exert influence on the mainstream parties.

The party with most to cheer out of this survey is undoubtedly the Conservatives. While skeptical views towards immigration remain strong, there has been a big shift in the attitudes of Conservative voters since 2011. Confident Multiculturalists now make up 17% of its supporters, compared to 5% five years ago, and together with Mainstream Liberals, 31% are very positive towards immigration, up from 17% in 2011. So as whereas in 2011, two thirds of Conservative supporters were either in the culturally concerned or the two hostile groups, now it is almost equally balanced with the most positive groups.

With a growing gulf in the attitudes between Conservatives and the two tribes on the right, it might be easier now for more moderate elements in the party to convince others to adopt more progressive policies. After all, if the Conservatives won a general election with UKIP attracting 15% of the vote, why should they feel forced to tack right when they clearly do not need UKIP support to win?

Whether the Conservatives will change accordingly is uncertain, as there are many who appear comfortable with the status quo, but if it does then it has the potential to greatly widen its supporter base considerable and even take in a significant proportion of Black and Minority Ethnic voters, many of whom share similar political and social characteristics with current Conservative supporters. BAME voters have traditionally identified with Labour but while that still holds true with some minority groups it is no longer universal. This, coupled with David Cameron's party conference speech where he signalled a desire to root out racial discrimination, could start to break down the long held associations with racial intolerance, or indifference to discrimination, which have tainted the Conservatives in the eyes of BAME voters since the time of Enoch Powell.



THE MIDDLE ENGLAND PROJECT

The survey provides HOPE not hate with the data to help us develop our work over the next few years. The first Fear and HOPE report gave birth to the Together project, an initiative that targeted Immigrant Ambivalents, and that is still ongoing today. This survey will herald a new initiative – The Middle England project.

The Middle England project is an initiative to engage with the voters in the culturally concerned tribe, to play their fears and help develop a more positive narrative around race, immigration, tackling extremism and bringing communities together.

While many in this group have real concerns on these issues, our survey shows that they can be engaged with and are open to ideas and policies as long as they feel that the underlying values, rules and traditions of British society are not compromised.

The 2016 Fear and HOPE report shows a clear and growing division between this tribe and the two more hostile tribes to its right. In fact, the Culturally Concerned group often share many of the same views and characteristics of the Immigrant Ambivalents and even the Mainstream Liberals.

There is a real opportunity to develop a new narrative around immigration, extremism and cohesion that can unite a large swathe of the population. However, for this to really be effective then we need to engage with the Culturally Concerned.

We believe that by working within local communities we can bring the positive voices to the fore, shift public opinion and give a platform to those who hold a more tolerant position. It is already evident that most people hold more tolerant and open views than the political discourse and media narrative would suggest. If we really want to change this discourse and narrative, we then have to give Middle England, with its most relaxed views, a voice.

This project will deploy HOPE not hate's organising team into these 'Middle England' communities in order to engage with them, understand their issues and concerns and help develop a more positive and open agenda. By organising locally we hope to prove to politicians and pundits that communities can be mobilised around our issues and this can have political benefits for politicians who adopt this or penalties for those who do not.

As part of this project we will employ a Parliamentary Officer to

work with politicians, other campaign groups and policy makers in the centre ground of politics.

There is a pragmatism over immigration and integration amongst British people that we seek to exploit and develop. While a third of Britons are already tolerant and relaxed about a multiracial society, there is another 44% who can be won over as long as their economic and cultural concerns are understood and addressed. By engaging these two groups, through the Together Project and now the Middle England Project, we can affect change and build a new consensus.

That is our goal and our prize.

And for the mainstream political parties there is an additional and quite obvious prize – winning elections in the future. Britain is a rapidly changing society any political party wishing to gain power in 15-20 years time is going to have to engage with a very different electorate.

The 2011 census puts Britain's minority populations on 13% but, according to the Policy Exchange, this is expected to rise to 20-30% by 2050.

Research by Manchester University academics Stephen Jivraj and Ludi Simpson suggest that by 2031 48 local authorities in the UK will be 'plural', meaning no one ethnic group is in the majority. Their study also found that as minorities were becoming more affluent so they were moving out of their traditional inner-city concentrations into smaller towns and suburban Britain. 'Segregation' has decreased, and that residential mixing of ethnic groups has accelerated in the past ten years.

Most interestingly, the 'typical' family household in Britain is changing too. The 2011 census revealed that one in eight households include multiple ethnicity, that's people with different ethnicities in the same household. The fastest growing minority are people who identify themselves as 'other' and the numbers of mixed-race people has doubled from 661,000 in 2001 to 1.2m in 2011.

Rather than waiting for this change to be forced upon them, HOPE not hate will start now to work with politicians, policy makers and campaign groups to ensure that the transition to an increasingly multi-ethnic society is as peaceful as possible but also rewarding for those who help drive this agenda forward.



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